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
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II

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QUARTERMASTER SUPPLY

in the

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II

Volume V

Sales Stores, Post Exchanges, Tentage, and Miscellaneous Supplies


BY

Eudora Ramsay Richardson

and

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THE QUARTERMASTER SCHOOL
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PREFACE

The conversation of the Walrus and the Carpenter in *Alice in Wonderland* dealt with subjects no more varied and incongruous than those that make up the contents of this volume. The heterogeneity, however, calls for no apology.

Many items and services provided by the Quartermaster Corps of World War II would have astonished American soldiers of an earlier day. Yet the paternalism that prompted their inclusion in the supply program is as old as the Army itself. The first edition of Army Regulations, published in 1779, imposed upon the Army Commander the responsibility for "keeping a watchful eye over the officers of companies, that they may pay the necessary attention to their men." This quaint document went on to say that each officer "should endeavour to gain the love of his men by his attention to everything that may contribute to their health and convenience."

Personnel and materiel, the only resources upon which an army can draw, are wholly interdependent. The best weapon of modern warfare is no better than the man who handles it. The Quartermaster Service and the Medical Service in active theaters keep men fit for combat and help return men to civil life fit for the duties of citizenship. The war was not won by weapons and ammunition, by food, by clothing and individual equipment, or by the genius of tacticians and logisticians but by all these elements working together.

Stationed in countries that had suffered years of depleting warfare, troops required items contributory to morale as well as to health and fighting efficiency. The difficulty of the supply task involved was in direct proportion to the variety of items and in inverse proportion to the quantities obtained.

The Army Exchange Service was dissolved in Europe in August 1943 and the Quartermaster Service was charged with the procurement and distribution of merchandise for sale in ex-

changes and commissaries. Though the Army Exchange Service was reestablished in Europe in May 1943, the Quartermaster Service continued to distribute post exchange items. The Army Exchange Service was the retailer, the Quartermaster Service the wholesaler.

The War Department defines class IV supplies as those "for which allowances are not prescribed, or which require special measures of control and are not otherwise classified." Within this broad definition, the Theater Chief Quartermaster grouped as class IV supplies: officers' and nurses' clothing and accessories; items procured specifically for war correspondents, members of the American Red Cross, and members of quasi-military organizations working with United States Forces; medals and decorations; and materials handling equipment not contained in standard tables of allowances or equipment. In the European Theater post exchange supplies, distributed by the Quartermaster Service but sold by the Army Exchange Service, were also grouped under class IV supplies.

Other volumes of this series treat of programs essential to the successful performance of troops. This volume treats of services equally as important as the supply of food, shelter, and clothing and individual equipment for the enlisted man. The series attempts to present the whole drama of quartermaster supply in the European Theater of Operations. This volume should be used in connection with volume II, which sets the stage, and volume VIII, which delineates the characters.

These studies are not to be considered official, for data other than those now available may be unearthed. It is hoped that persons who took part in the quartermaster program of the European Theater will send constructive criticisms that can be incorporated in a revised edition.

15 March 1949

Eudora Ramsay Richardson

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CHAPTER 1

SALES STORES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

Officers of the United States Army in World War II purchased all regular uniform items except wool-knit caps and steel helmets, complete. They were beneficiaries of the Quartermaster Corps only so far as individual equipment and special clothing were concerned. All officers, whether in the Regular Army or the Reserve Corps, who were commissioned before 14 May 1940 had dug into their pockets in order to bring about their sartorial conversion from civilians to officers. Then by a munificent act of Congress, Reserve officers were given a clothing allowance of \$50 if they should serve 3 months during a 12-month period. Their cumulative allowances, however, might not exceed \$150. On 9 March 1942 the Congress authorized an initial clothing allowance of \$150 for each officer who had been commissioned on or before 26 September 1941.¹ The allowance was increased in 1943 to \$250.² Newly commissioned officers drew the whole amount, and other officers drew \$100—the difference between the old and new allowances. In the zone of interior officers might purchase clothing from quartermaster sales stores or from haberdashers and tailors. In theaters of operations they depended entirely upon sales stores.

ESTABLISHMENT OF SALES STORES

Clothing and accessories for men and women officers of the United States Army and for other authorized persons were handled in the European Theater of Operations by static and mobile sales stores. The Quartermaster Service did not plan until August 1942 to operate sales stores. Then it received information that the Commanding General of the Services of Supply had directed the Quartermaster Corps to purchase, ship, and store merchandise for sale at exchanges and commissaries in theaters of operations outside the continental limits of the United States and had published a list of the items that the Quartermaster Corps would be permitted to purchase for resale.³

On 24 August 1942 Major General John C. H. Lee, Commanding General, SOS, ETOUSA, dissolved the Army Exchange Service and transferred its functions to the Quartermaster Service.⁴ Then personnel in the Supply Division of OCQM who were in charge of officers' clothing were combined with personnel of the Army

Exchange Service to form the Exchange Service Division of OCQM.⁵ In November the Exchange Service Division became the Sales Store Division.⁶ It was then that the sales store program got under way. A directive reestablishing the Army Exchange Service was published on 24 April 1943.⁷ After 1 May 1943 sales stores in the European Theater of Operations handled only officers' clothing and accessories.

The bulk depots that were established in London, Ashchurch, Liverpool, and Bristol on 27 November 1942 handled both post exchange and sales store items and supplied designated distribution depots, which in turn supplied sales stores.⁸ By 30 November distribution depots had been set up as follows:

Distribution Depot	Manpower
G-14 —Liverpool	20,000
G-20 —Burton-on-Trent	25,000
G-25 —Ashchurch	20,000
G-35 —Bristol	10,000
G-45 —Thatcham	30,000
G-50 —Taunton	10,000
Q-107—Stowmarket	20,000
Q-110—London	20,000*

In December provision was made for the establishment of sales stores in London, Cheltenham, and Belfast. Model stocks for officers' and nurses' clothing were prescribed for these stores (see apps. I and II). All requisitions should conform to these model stocks. No model stock for mobile sales units had been worked out at that time.¹⁰ The sales stores would make requisitions on depot Q-110 in London and in so doing would report not only the amount of stock required but also the amount of stock on hand.¹¹ At the same time the depot in Belfast was designated as a distribution depot authorized to provide sales store items to organizations and directed to make requisitions on depot G-14 in Liverpool.¹² In addition to standard items of officers' clothing and accessories, sales stores sold to officers many items of regular issue to enlisted men.¹³

A mobile clothing unit began operations in the Eastern Base Section on 27 December 1942 without benefit of prescribed model stocks. On 23 January the sales store officer reported that six stations had been served and that the following merchandise had been sold:

Item	Quantity
Belts, web	45
Blouses	191
Caps	204
Coats, burberry	97
Coats, trench	144
Drawers, thick	118
Drawers, thin	81
Gloves	46
Handkerchiefs	2,603
Jackets, field	62
Linings, trench-coat	124
Overcoats	95
Overshoes	58
Pajamas, fancy	305
Pajamas, plain	95
Pants, od	57
Shirts, khaki	239
Shirts, od	226
Shirts, poplin	94
Shoes, buckle	168
Shoes, high-top	65
Shoes, laced	184
Slacks, green	259
Slacks, pink	285
Slippers	82
Socks, wool	1,401
Ties	1,174
Towels	423
Vests, thick	142
Vests, thin	65 ¹⁴

The commanding officer of the area in which a sales store was located was responsible for its operation and for the personnel it employed and was answerable to his base section commander. OCQM, however, was responsible for prescribing model stock, fixing prices, and providing supplies.¹⁵

By mid-July 1943 the quartermaster of the Western Base Section was of the opinion that a sales store for officers' and nurses' clothing would soon be required at Lichfield, Liverpool, Glasgow, and Cardiff. The first of these was opened at Lichfield on 19 July with a model stock of clothing for 850 officers. The quartermaster of the Western Base Section recommended that stock be increased by 31 December to accommodate 5,000 officers. He was of the opinion that the sales store at Liverpool should be opened on or about 1 September with a model stock for 1,500 officers and that the stock should be enlarged by 31 December to accommodate 7,500 officers. The sales stores at Glasgow and Cardiff should also be opened on 1 September, each with a model stock for 1,000 officers. By 31 December the stock at Glasgow should be enlarged to accommodate 2,500 officers, and the stock at Cardiff to accommodate 5,000 officers. As soon as sufficient quartermaster officer per-

sonnel should be available, a base section sales officer would be designated. Procedures for inventorying and stock-record accounting were being set up at Lichfield immediately. Results would be analyzed and used as a basis for setting up procedures throughout the base section. In order to cover stations not accessible to static stores, the Western Base Section quartermaster requested that one platoon of a mobile sales store unit be assigned to the Western Base Section.¹⁶

Upon receipt of the ambitious program planned for the Western Base Section, the Deputy Chief Quartermaster replied that periodic increase of model stocks and activation of sales stores, though highly desirable, should be governed by availability of stock. Despite a very evident improvement in the supply situation, it was still necessary to proceed with caution. To this end he suggested that recommendations for the activation of new stores be sent in separate letters not more than 30 days before the desired date of opening and that recommendations for the increase of model stocks be sent not more than 30 days before the increase was needed. In each case the base section quartermaster should establish a priority. Such a plan would enable OCQM to evaluate each recommendation. If efforts then being made to activate an additional mobile sales company proved successful, the Western Base Section would be assigned one platoon indefinitely.¹⁷

Following the suggestion, the quartermaster of the Western Base Section recommended that two additional sales stores be activated on or about 1 September 1943. The first of these should be in Glasgow, and the second in Cardiff. The initial stock of each store should be based upon 1,000 officers.¹⁸ On 19 August OCQM approved the establishment of a sales store in Glasgow and sent the quartermaster of the Western Base Section a computation of model stock for 1,000 officers (see app. III). When the strength of nurses and WAC officers should be known, OCQM would compute model stocks and forward them.¹⁹

Sales stores were activated in the United Kingdom at Services of Supply headquarters in Cheltenham and in the base sections as follows:

Base Section	Sales Store
Southern	Tavistock
Western	Glasgow
Eastern	Bovington
Central	London
Northern	Belfast
Ireland	Seskinore Toome ²⁰

A map showing their location appears as appendix IV.



Figure 1.—Interior of the London Sales Store.



Figure 2.—Components of a Mobile Sales Store.



Figure 3.—British Master Tailor Fitting Uniforms in London Sales Store.

RATIONING OF OFFICERS' CLOTHING

Rationing of uniforms to be sold to United States officers had its beginning before the creation of the European Theater of Operations. The program was motivated by the need not only to conserve shipping space but also to conform to the strict economy that had long been practiced in the United Kingdom. The United States Army Forces in the British Isles (USAFBI) instituted the rationing of uniforms in March 1942, decreeing that 212 coupons would be issued to a newly commissioned officer and 88 coupons to each officer for annual maintenance. Since many officers were reaching the United Kingdom without their full equipment, arrangements were made with the British Board of Trade for obtaining coupons in bulk. The coupons were held and distributed by the London quartermaster of USAFBI and the quartermaster of the United States Army, Northern Ireland Forces, (USANIF). Officers applying for coupons would indicate the article that they needed, and quartermasters would keep records of coupons issued in order that USAFBI might make a full report to the British Board of Trade. The coupons might not be used for the purchase of civilian clothing.²¹

The plan continued in effect after the establishment of the European Theater. In the fall of 1942, however, it was subjected to careful analysis. Undoubtedly rationing should not be stopped. Indiscriminate purchase of uniforms and accessories by United States officers would bring about a most unfavorable reaction, particularly because a procurement program in Great Britain was under way. The control plan at that time consisted of British ration books and loose coupons to be used in civilian establishments.

If officers should be prohibited from purchasing in civilian stores, quantities sold to them could be controlled and sales to unauthorized persons could be prevented. On the other hand, such a plan was not workable. Sales stores were inaccessible to about a third of the United States officers in the United Kingdom. Others who could reach the stores could not remain for necessary fittings. Still others preferred custom-made uniforms. Therefore, a control plan should cover purchase from both army sales stores and civilian establishments.

The new plan, as propounded by OCQM, was based upon the turn-in of all British ration books and loose coupons. Officers would be issued new coupon books valid for purchase of uniforms and accessories in army sales stores and civilian establishments. Neither sales stores nor civilian establishments might sell uniforms and accessories unless an officer pre-

sented his identification card and the required number of coupons. An officer who needed a complete wardrobe would be issued 400 coupons, though the ration of a British officer was 212 coupons. The complete initial issue, which no officer should need in its entirety, would require 406 coupons. The annual United States maintenance allowance was set at 240 coupons, though the British allowance was 88 coupons. The disparity in the figures was thought to be justified because of the small amount of baggage that United States officers were permitted to bring with them.²²

A circular based upon the proposed plan was drawn up in OCQM and submitted to the Commanding General, SOS, ETOUSA. This was forwarded to the Commanding General of the Theater on 24 November with a recommendation that SOS, ETOUSA, be authorized to control the purchase of officers' clothing and accessories in the Theater because it was desirable that Americans should not seem extravagant in comparison with the British and because many United States officers' uniforms would be manufactured in the United Kingdom.²³

While the circular was being considered, service coats, trousers, and overcoats would be sold only to officers who could show that they had no more than one service coat and one pair of trousers and no overcoat. An officer was permitted to purchase only the following items:

Item	Quantity
Cap, service	1
Coat, service	1
Coat, trench, with lining	1
Gloves	2
Handkerchief, cotton, white or khaki	12
Jacket, field	1
Muffler, wool	1
Overcoat, EM	1
Pajamas	2
Shirt, EM, worsted, flannel, or cotton	4
Socks, wool or cotton	6
Sweater	1
Tie	2
Trousers, EM	1
Underclothing set, wool or cotton	6 ²⁴

The British thought the proposed American ration exorbitant. After a series of conferences Mr. C. H. Carruthers of the British Board of Trade formally requested the United States Army to accept the British scale. All British maintenance allowances, moreover, had been lowered: the male Army officers' ration from 88 to 76 coupons, the Auxiliary Territorial Service's ration from 100 to 88 coupons, the

Nursing Services' ration from 104 to 93 coupons, the male RAF officers' ration from 100 to 88 coupons, and the WAAF officers' ration from 100 to 88 coupons. The initial outfit allowances had not been reduced, but the first annual maintenance allowance of newly commissioned officers had been cut in half.²⁵

Mr. Carruthers' letter, which had been addressed to Lieutenant Colonel John L. Horner, then commanding officer of depot Q-110 in London, was forwarded at once to Brigadier General Robert M. Littlejohn. Lieutenant Colonel Horner had come to England in June 1941 in the capacity of quartermaster to the American embassy in London.²⁶ At the Board of Trade he had represented the American forces in all early discussions bearing upon rationing. The British, he said, had been cooperative and never arbitrary. The letter he had received from Mr. Carruthers led him to inquire as to his authority. Though he had received a personal letter from the Adjutant General, SOS, ETOUSA, asking him to take a hand in setting up a rationing program acceptable to the British, Lieutenant Colonel Horner wanted a directive authorizing him to act. Obviously distressed that no satisfactory program had been formulated, he urged that coupons be collected at sales stores in order that officers might not equip themselves from United States stocks and also buy in the civilian market. He concluded his letter by urging that the Board of Trade be given an immediate answer.²⁷

The decision, however, continued to be postponed. Lieutenant Colonel Horner was told of the circular that had been in the hands of the Theater Commander since 24 November and was assured that discussions then in progress should bring about results.²⁸ When nothing had happened by mid-January, Mr. N. R. Tempest of the British Board of Trade wrote Brigadier General Littlejohn that an immediate decision was important because clothing ration books were about to be printed and the number needed should be known.²⁹ Lieutenant Colonel Horner, still beset by his old friends at the British Board of Trade, wrote again on 21 January, saying that a definite program must be given to the British.³⁰ Once more the Deputy Chief Quartermaster replied that the Theater would soon publish a circular on the control of rationing.³¹ The promise was fulfilled a few days later by Circular No. 10, ETOUSA, dated 1 February 1943, which prescribed the initial allowance and the annual maintenance allowance of officers' clothing and accessories. The honor system had not been abandoned. When an officer purchased from an army sales store or depot, he was required to certify that the items were within authorized allowances and for his

personal use. Each officer was entitled to one British clothing coupon book. Officers would receive the books from local quartermasters and would sign a statement to the effect that they would not use the coupons to purchase items beyond authorized allowances. It was understood that the British would sell nothing to officers unless identification cards were presented.³² The circular appears as appendix V.

The London Base Command, where the principal sales store was located, found Circular No. 10 wholly unsatisfactory. Its instructions were said to be confusing and its procedure at variance with British Board of Trade regulations. It prescribed no actual coupon allowance and permitted purchases in excess of British Board of Trade allowances. Some men and women officers were buying more than they needed and, in view of the scarcity of material and labor in the United Kingdom, were likely to bring about shortages that would deprive other officers of necessary items. The London Base Command recommended, therefore, that Circular No. 10 be repealed and suggested the following tables of allowances:

**For United States Officers, Warrant Officers,
War Correspondents, and Others of
Relative Officer Rank**

Item	Unit	Allow- ance	No. of Coupons
Blouse	ea.	2	34
Cap	ea.	2	4
Gloves	pr.	1	2
Handkerchief	ea.	10	5
Overcoat) or)	ea.	1	37
Trenchcoat)			
Pajamas	pr.	1	8
Shirt, cotton	ea.	4	28
Shirt, woollen	ea.	3	21
Socks	pr.	6	18
Tie	ea.	4	4
Trousers	pr.	3	24
Underwear	suit	5	40
Total			225

For Women Civilian Drivers

Blouse	ea.	2	24
Cap	ea.	1	2
Gloves	pr.	1	2
Overcoat	ea.	1	18
Raincoat	ea.	1	15
Shirt and collar	ea.	4	28
Shoes	pr.	1	5
Shirt	ea.	2	12
Stockings, lisle	pr.	6	18
Tie	ea.	2	2
Total			126

For Clubmobile Operators and Hospital Workers

Battle dress	}	ea.	1	
or				21
Hospital dress	}	ea.	3	
Blouse		ea.	1	12
Cap		ea.	1	2
Gloves		pr.	1	2
Handkerchief		doz.	1	3
Hose		pr.	9	27
Nightgown		ea.	2	14
Overboots		pr.	1	7
Raincoat		ea.	1	12
Scarf		ea.	1	1
Shirt		ea.	5	30
Shoes		pr.	1	5
Skirt		ea.	1	6
Suspender belt (girdle)		ea.	1	3
Sweater		ea.	1	5
Tie		ea.	2	2
Underwear		suit	—	14
			Total	166 ³³

The scale of allowances advocated by the London Base Command drew a protest from OCQM. The number of coupons was too small to permit officers to keep themselves presentable. All arrived with inadequate supplies of clothing, and those that came by plane had little more than they brought on their backs. Then too, the laundry and dry-cleaning situation in the United Kingdom fell far short of officers' needs.³⁴

On 31 December 1943 the instructions that OCQM published covering the use of clothing coupon books were based on Circular No. 10, ETOUSA. Local quartermasters might draw clothing coupon books in bulk from the Chief Quartermaster. They would make books available to officers, nurses, warrant officers, flight officers, and United States civilians authorized by the War Department to wear officer-type uniforms. The coupons might be used within the allowances of Circular No. 10 to purchase articles of uniform and accessories needed to supplement wardrobes. Local quartermasters would improvise and maintain adequate records concerning the receipt and issues of coupons. Any officer needing additional coupons to supplement his wardrobe within the allowances prescribed in Circular No. 10 might obtain them by certifying that they would be used to purchase specific items of clothing.³⁵

PROBLEMS

On 10 July 1943 Brigadier General Littlejohn wrote as follows to Brigadier General William M. Goodman, Commanding General of the New York Port of Embarkation: "The supply of of-

ficers' clothing here in the United Kingdom has become a nightmare within the last 60 days. It seems to be impossible for me to keep any stock on hand.... For several months London has been, so to speak, the cross roads of the world and I am being called upon over night to furnish clothing to anybody and everybody."

He concluded his considerable tale of woe by inviting Brigadier General Goodman to be an eye witness of sales store conditions in the Theater. "The months of July and August are relatively hot in New York but cool—I might even say cold—in England," he wrote. "Why not come over and make us a visit during your hot periods?"³⁶

Too Little Brought to the Theater

Brigadier General Littlejohn blamed his troubles on the small amount of clothing and accessories that officers brought with them. In fact, he had been unable to get any War Department instructions bearing upon the subject. Were any orders in existence? Perhaps Brigadier General Goodman could give some personal advice that would enable Brigadier General Littlejohn to propose a solution.³⁷

In his reply Brigadier General Goodman enclosed a copy of T/E 21 of 10 March 1943. Though the new table had been published in June, it had not been sent to OCQM. So great an effort was being made to hold down the amount of baggage that a strong case would have to be presented to get authorization for more than one uniform to be taken to the Theater.³⁸ Before Brigadier General Goodman's letter arrived, Major General Lee asked Brigadier General F. S. Ross, Chief of Transportation, what clothing and accessories officers were being advised to bring and what he recommended. The reply was "one bedding roll, one foot locker, and one handbag for all except general officers."³⁹ When asked whether or not any standard instructions were being given to officers alerted for the European Theater, newly arrived officers said that they knew of none—a statement that was corroborated by an examination of movement orders. They had been informed, moreover, that the climate in the United Kingdom was so mild that little warm clothing was needed.⁴⁰

On 22 August the Chief Quartermaster told the Chief of Services that the information contained in Brigadier General Goodman's letter had caused him to prepare requisitions on the assumption that officers would arrive with very little clothing. Those who had recently reached the Theater were telling him that an effort was being made to limit items to those prescribed

in T/E 21. Therefore, the Chief Quartermaster had requested an increased maintenance allowance.⁴¹

Though Brigadier General Littlejohn sent other protests, he met with little success. Space on transports and planes was at a premium. Since officers could not know exactly what they would need and were seldom informed as to their destination, it seemed wiser to bring too little clothing than too much. On 9 October 1943 Brigadier General Goodman expressed regret that he could not be of assistance and suggested that the Theater seek to obtain from the War Department a definite statement as to what clothing officers would bring. Then he would try to hasten the shipment of the most needed sales store items.⁴²

Tariffs and Factors

A scarcity of small sizes in clothing for men and women was a constant source of annoyance. The problem was common to the North African Theater and the European Theater. Colonel William H. Middleswart wrote Brigadier General Littlejohn on 26 November 1943 that he was receiving many large-sized women's garments and few small-sized. As a means of bringing about solution, he was then conducting a survey to determine the actual sizes worn by nurses in his theater and would report his findings to the War Department.⁴³ Colonel John B. Franks, then serving as Acting Chief Quartermaster, replied that OCQM had recommended a revision of tariffs for men and women in line with experience and that changes recently proposed by PEMBARK would give some relief if they were adopted.⁴⁴ OQMG reported on 16 December 1943 that in a recent requisition the smallest sizes of officers' clothing were totally unavailable and that all small sizes were very scarce.⁴⁵ Another protest from OCQM on 8 January 1944 and much subsequent correspondence showed that the problem was of a continuing nature.⁴⁶

Lack of a distribution factor hampered sales store operations. The number of items requisitioned in excess of the number of persons to be fitted, expressed in a percentage, is known as the distribution factor. In other words, if 100 persons are to be issued uniforms and 125 uniforms are requisitioned, the distribution factor is 25 percent. The War Department had authorized no distribution factor for inclusion in requisitions for officers' clothing. Upon the Chief Quartermaster's insistence that a distribution factor be used in computing the number of sized items needed,⁴⁷ General Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell that balanced stocks of officers',

nurses', and WAC officers' clothing and accessories could not be maintained at all points of distribution through the sole medium of the authorized 75-day level. The 14 static stores and 7 mobile units that had operated originally had been reduced to 5 static stores and 4 mobile units because of low stockage. Unless distribution factors were provided, the number of sales stores would have to be further decreased. The Quartermaster Service could not perform its sales store mission with fewer stores. Many officers who traveled great distances to distributing points could not wait for alterations but had to be supplied in a single visit. Without a distribution factor, replenishment of sizes had to be made by small supplementary requisitions, which brought about considerable delay.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, the War Department did not authorize a distribution factor except for nurses' items.⁴⁹

Maintenance, or replacement, factors computed by OQMG were found to be too low even during the static period in the United Kingdom. These factors were the measures used to express the life span of an item. The method by which they were derived is fully explained in volume III, chapter 2. While the Chief Quartermaster was in Washington in December 1943, he presented a strong argument for large maintenance factors (see app. VI). Upon his return to the Theater he sent The Quartermaster General a recapitulation. Relatively high maintenance factors were necessary because many officers arrived with few clothes and because the standard of military appearance in the European Theater of Operations was high and the cleaning and laundry facilities were poor. He may have been guilty of innuendo when he wrote, "There are few if any officers here who repose more than eight hours per day in a bunk. The remaining sixteen hours per day puts considerable wear and tear on an officer's uniform."⁵⁰

The argument between OQMG and OCQM dragged on. Because it dealt with the clothing of both officers and enlisted men, it is fully recorded in volume III, chapter 2. Though the problem was never wholly solved, maintenance factors used for computing a number of sales store items were increased.

Tailoring

In the summer of 1942 the Chief Quartermaster attempted to augment his small stocks of officers' uniforms by a procurement program in the United Kingdom. He met, however, with all manner of difficulties. British factories operated differently from American factories. They had lost their experienced employees.



Figure 4.—Military Women in Olive-drab Uniforms.



Figure 5.—ETO Nurses in Blue Uniforms.

They were not accustomed to American patterns. Therefore, after a futile effort, the Chief Quartermaster admitted that procurement in the United Kingdom would not solve his problem.⁵¹

Learning that officers were having their uniforms made or altered by civilians, he deputized Colonel Michael H. Zwicker, Chief of the Procurement Division, to investigate tailoring facilities in London. The custom tailors were found to be charging exorbitant prices. The small, insufficiently staffed tailor shops were overloaded with work for United States Army officers. Consequently, the work was being done slowly and poorly. Colonel Zwicker recommended that alterations be done by some master tailor to be employed in the London sales store and by one reputable tailoring house that would agree to a reasonable price. The master tailor would mark the garments and send them to the contractor, who would make the alterations.⁵²

During the summer of 1943 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas B. Phillips, Chief of the Supply Division, made a survey of the alteration problem. The sales stores in Liverpool, Lichfield, Cheltenham, and Kettering had made satisfactory, though unofficial, arrangements with local tailors. The sales store in London had no such arrangements because Brigadier General Pleas B. Rogers, Headquarters Commandant, had raised objections. Lieutenant Colonel Phillips recommended that all sales stores except the one in London continue their arrangements; that mobile sales stores throughout the United Kingdom make no attempt to alter uniforms; and that Major Robert Cohen of the Procurement Division talk to the Ministry of Supply about the possibility of making a national agreement that would solve the problem in London.⁵³ Colonel Turner R. Sharpe, then Deputy Chief Quartermaster in OCQM London headquarters, agreed to Lieutenant Colonel Phillips' suggestion.⁵⁴ The four sales stores outside London continued their unofficial agreements with local tailors, and arrangements were made for alterations in the London store to be done by a master tailor, who would fit and mark the garments, and by a factory, which would do the final work.⁵⁵

ETO Uniform

The Chief Quartermaster began in 1942 his campaign for obtaining the ETO uniform for all personnel in the Theater. Because the many battles that finally ended in victory centered about the outfitting of both officers and enlisted men and women, the story of the ETO

uniform is told in volume III, chapters 5 and 8.

OUTFITTING MILITARY WOMEN

Military women are not a product of the modern era. In fact, Rudyard Kipling could have made no claim to the discovery that the "female of the species is more deadly than the male," or at times capable of being more deadly. Many women of the past demonstrated their powers of military leadership. In the century before Christ the girl queen Cleopatra, banished to Syria, organized a force and succeeded—albeit by somewhat devious methods—in bringing about her return to the throne of the Ptolemies. In the first century Boadicea, fierce queen of Britain, rallied her people to resist Roman brutality. In the third century Zenobia, queen of Palmyra, sent her armies to occupy Egypt and dared to defy the great Roman Empire. Isabella, and not Ferdinand, was the militaristic and far-seeing ruler of mighty Spain. With her navy Queen Elizabeth defeated the invincible Spanish Armada and laid the cornerstone of the British Empire. Queen Maria Theresa effected the consolidation of Austria and Hungary. Catherine I put Russia on the map and Catherine II kept it there.

The military history of the United States has a goodly scattering of heroines. In the Indian Massacre of 1622, which wiped out a third of the first permanent English settlers in the New World, women fought and died along with their men or fought and lived to help found the earliest American commonwealth. As the frontier pushed westward, women defended their stockaded homes with whatever crude weapons were at hand. Women were scouts and spies in the American Revolution and also in the Civil War, during which they served both the Federal and the Confederate Armies. A few stories that can be documented and many that were handed down by word of mouth tell of women who wore uniforms and followed their husbands and sons to battle.

Nevertheless, the industrial side of culture has belonged to women and the militant side to men. Women military leaders are the exceptions to a rule from which there has been little deviation. In warfare women have been the conservers rather than destroyers. A few ambitious queens have sought power through conquest, but other women who have participated in their countries' wars have fought to preserve their families and their hearth fires. The military women of World War II, though dressed in army uniforms, were not shooting soldiers. They did not repudiate their highest traditions.

WAC Officers

When Representative Edith Nourse Rogers of Massachusetts introduced into the Congress a bill to put women in the United States Army, she had the backing of the organized women of America. When the bill establishing the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps was enacted into law, however, on 14 May 1942,⁵⁶ leaders among women deplored the presence of the word *auxiliary* in the name of the organization. They were quick to say that the bill should have given women in the Army equality of status with men—in pay, dependency allotments, and government insurance.

The organization of military women was known as the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps when its first members reached the European Theater of Operations. In February 1943, 2 officers were sent to the United Kingdom and were attached to the Eighth Air Force as telephone supervisor and assistant telephone supervisor. The WAAC Director and Assistant Director arrived on 3 April 1943 and were followed in May and early June by 10 officers and 5 enrolled members. The first WAAC battalion, consisting of 19 officers and 55 enrolled members, reached the Theater on 16 June.⁵⁷ Less than 2 weeks later the organization became the Women's Army Corps. Its members were accorded most of the privileges enjoyed by men of the United States Army.⁵⁸

Development of the clothing for the proposed women's corps was made an OQMG responsibility several months before Mrs. Rogers' bill was enacted into law. The evolution of the uniform is traced in a monograph appearing among QMC Historical Studies. The issue of items in the European Theater and the development of the special items that were made available to both officers and enlisted women, such as the ETO uniform, are treated in volume III of this series.

In stocking sales stores with articles needed by WAC officers, OQMG encountered problems that had to be solved without the aid of precedent and army doctrine. These problems were in inverse proportion to the number of women to be served, for it is harder to provide a sufficient range of sizes for a few customers than for many customers. By February 1944 there were 179 WAC officers in the Theater and by March 1944 there were 274—a figure that remained constant throughout the static period in the United Kingdom.⁵⁹ Yet among the WAC officers there was an unpredicted variety of figures. There were fat women, lean women, tall women, short women, and women made by patterns of Venus of Medici and Venus of Milo

and by patterns known only to creators of gargoyles.

Officers of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, as well as enrolled members, were issued clothing and individual equipment as prescribed in T/E 21. After the organization became the Women's Army Corps, its officers were given the initial clothing allowance of \$250. Therefore, the outfitting of women officers was not a sales store problem until 1 September 1943. The first Waacs to be sent to the United Kingdom had been issued the temperate-climate allowance of clothing prescribed in T/E 21 of 10 March 1943. Many women were of the opinion that the Quartermaster Corps had shown more generosity than wisdom in the issue of clothing. It would have been better, they said, to provide "a more limited wardrobe of carefully selected items."⁶⁰ They pronounced the summer pajamas unbecoming and the khaki-colored brassieres and girdles unsuited to the feminine torso. They preferred to stop under-arm perspiration rather than to wear dress shields.⁶¹ These items were eliminated in the T/E 21 of 15 December 1943 but not before many had been sent to the European Theater to become a drug on the market.⁶²

On the other hand, women who came to the Theater equipped with allowances prescribed in the temperate summer-winter column of T/E 21, 15 December 1943, did not bring clothing that was warm enough for the British climate. More than half of the Wacs worked in inadequately heated buildings, which were usually some distance from their barracks. Some of the offices were underground and very damp. Because the needed clothing could not be obtained in civilian stores, G-1 urged that it be made available through the Quartermaster Service.⁶³ Increases were effected in the Theater both in items issued to enlisted women and in sales store stocks.⁶⁴

Officers, men and women, seeking uniforms and accessories in the United Kingdom, had many problems in common, such as insufficiency of small sizes, lack of distribution factors, ration limitations, and lack of competent tailors to make alterations. The women experienced their greatest difficulties, however, during the Continental period, when changes in items of WAC clothing necessitated many purchases.

ARMY NURSES

During World War II outfitting the army nurse became a large problem. Then for the first time the Army Nurse Corps was composed of officers who were accorded actual rank. Nurses, however, played a part in all wars

fought by Americans, though in an earlier day they were lacking in technical and military training. Until the Spanish-American War most of the nursing was done unofficially by volunteers.

As early as 1802 the United States Army was authorized by the Congress to employ nurses, and even before that date nurses were sometimes paid for services they had performed with no thought of remuneration. In an old order book it is recorded that one Mary Driskell, a nurse in the Continental Hospital in Fredericksburg, Virginia, from January 1779 to May 1782 was paid 266 pounds and 19 shillings, or \$46.00, a month.⁶⁵ During the Civil War a nurse was commissioned in the Confederate Army. She was Sally Tompkins, 27 years old when the war began and possessed of a desire to save the lives of wounded soldiers. With her own fortune and with money she collected from friends she established a hospital in Richmond. Because military discipline needed to be maintained, President Jefferson Davis commissioned Sally Tompkins as a captain.⁶⁶

While Captain Sally Tompkins was tending thousands of wounded Confederate soldiers in Richmond, Clara Barton was bringing relief to wounded soldiers in Fredericksburg—50 miles away. All the world knows of Florence Nightingale's ministry of mercy during the Crimean War and of the military hospitals Clara Barton organized during the Franco-Prussian War. Though Dr. Anita Newcombe McGee recruited 1,500 nurses in 1898-99 to serve in the Spanish-American War, the group was not officially connected with the United States Army. The Army Nurse Corps was created by act of Congress on 2 February 1901.⁶⁷ During World War I nurses served without benefit of rank. It was not until 1920 that they were given relative rank, with the chief nurse equivalent to a major. In 1942 the ranks were raised to include those of lieutenant colonel and colonel. On 9 June 1944 an act of Congress accorded actual rank to members of the Army Nurse Corps.⁶⁸ The largest group of women serving with the armed forces overseas, the Army Nurse Corps, presented the greatest outfitting problem.

Full gratuitous issue of nurses' uniforms was a World War II innovation. Dortha Linde Dix, designated Superintendent of Women Nurses during the Civil War, attempted to control the dress of her nurses by forbidding the fashionable hoop skirts, bows, and curls of her day. On 24 July 1862 The Surgeon General prescribed plain dresses (brown, gray, black) "without ornament of any kind." In 1898 the Manual for the Medical Department announced, "No uniform has yet been prescribed, but for the pres-

ent a nurse is expected to furnish and wear such dress, apron and cap as are usually considered suitable." The 1900 manual, however, prescribed a hospital uniform that reflected the "Gibson girl" fashion—"a white linen shirt waist and apron with skirt, necktie if needed, and a short jacket of galatea." The chief nurse would wear "a red silk sash, knotted around the waist, with or without the apron."

A field service uniform was authorized in 1911, a one-piece dress of blue-gray cotton crepe with plain white collar and cap. The first outdoor uniform appeared in 1916. Consisting of a blue skirt, coat, overcoat, hat, and a white or blue shirtwaist, it was to be worn "at such times as the Surgeon General may prescribe" and "at any time the nurse is not on duty." In 1918 the War Department authorized the issue to members of the Army Nurse Corps of one blue Norfolk jacket, one blue overcoat, one blue flannel shirtwaist, and one blue velour hat. The items were provided by the American Red Cross. With this meager amount of gratuitous clothing, the army nurse sailed for Europe to serve with the American Expeditionary Forces.

Soon after the signing of the Armistice, The Judge Advocate General rendered the decision that members of the Army Nurse Corps were entitled to a "gratuitous issue of clothing." In 1920 the blue uniform was replaced by an olive-drab uniform. Because its wearing was not mandatory in time of peace, the nurses laid it aside in favor of mufti. For the next 20 years the nurse's wardrobe was not a matter of concern to the United States Army. In 1940, because of a preference expressed by 98 percent of the nurses, a blue uniform was chosen to replace the olive drab.⁶⁹

The Change to Olive Drab

When OCQM opened its offices in June 1942, the United States Army nurses in the United Kingdom were equipped with coats, skirts, and capes of blue covert wool, blue garrison caps, blue shirtwaists and white shirtwaists, black ties, and gloves of black leather and of blue wool. The Table of Basic Allowances that was published on 20 June 1942 carried no radical changes in nurses' clothing and individual equipment.⁷⁰ On 22 October 1942 the Chief of the Sales Store Division computed 1943 requirements for nurses, setting forth the number of blue items necessary for the nurse strength anticipated in the United Kingdom.⁷¹ He did not know that a cablegram had just been sent from the States, bringing news that the uniform was being changed again from blue to olive drab.⁷²

Representatives of the Army Nurse Corps, the Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot, and OQMG had met in Services of Supply headquarters on 4 September 1942 for the purpose of reviewing problems connected with outfitting nurses. The discussion centered about specific items required in combat areas, restyling of clothing, and development of new items. The next day The Surgeon General requested that the procurement of blue uniforms be discontinued at once. Representatives of the Services of Supply, the Office of The Quartermaster General, and the Office of The Surgeon General agreed that the change from blue to olive drab would be made in the zone of interior after the blue cloth and the blue uniforms on hand should have been exhausted but that nurses alerted for oversea duty would be issued olive-drab uniforms as soon as possible. The Quartermaster General thought that the issue to nurses in the zone of interior could begin on 1 July 1943 and to nurses overseas on 1 April 1943.⁷³

Upon receipt of the news that olive drab would replace blue, OCQM cabled the War Department for full information and asked that samples of fabrics and a completed uniform be sent to the Theater as soon as possible.⁷⁴ On 26 November 1942, when neither specifications nor samples had been received, OCQM cabled a request that they be forwarded at once.⁷⁵ Compliance, however, was not possible, for OQMG was in the throes of developing the new uniform. Because of the many difficulties involved, OQMG recommended that the date for putting nurses into olive drab be changed to 1 July 1943 for theaters of operations and to 1 September 1943 for the zone of interior. Because of the large stock of blue uniforms, the decision was subsequently reached to postpone indefinitely the issue of olive-drab uniforms in the zone of interior.⁷⁶

The basis of issue was set forth in amendment 58 to T/BA 21, dated 21 December 1942. The Theater, however, having received no specific information, continued to grope in the dark. On 4 March 1943 OCQM requested specifications of nurses' low-quarter shoes⁷⁷ and on 12 April repeated the request and asked also that specifications for the nurses' olive-drab woolen service cap be sent.⁷⁸ On 25 April came the reply that specifications for the shoes were not available and that specifications for the cap were being mailed.⁷⁹

On 10 April 1943 OCQM had inquired as to whether the olive-drab uniform should be sold to nurses or issued free.⁸⁰ On 17 April OQMG had replied that the winter uniform of 14-ounce barathea would be free but that the summer

uniform of tropical worsted would be sold. Disposition of the blue uniform, however, was still a moot question.⁸¹ Back flashed a cablegram asking for a complete list of the items in the free issue.⁸² OQMG gave the first specific information on 24 April. The initial free issue would consist of the following items: uniform (skirt and jacket), cape, overcoat, cap, seersucker outfit, pair of tan shoes, and brown pocketbook.⁸³ Amendment No. 58 of T/BA 21, which had reached the Theater, authorized two olive-drab woolen jackets, two skirts, nine seersucker uniforms, three seersucker caps, and two pairs of low-quarter service shoes. When OCQM cabled for clarification,⁸⁴ it was informed that the amendment to T/BA 21 was being changed to incorporate the list given in the cablegram of 24 April.⁸⁵ OCQM was still somewhat in the dark. Were all the items to be on the free list?⁸⁶ On 31 May 1943 OCQM received the following list of items that were to be issued free to nurses in the European Theater of Operations:

Item	Unit	Quantity
Bag, utility, nurses'	ea.	1
Cap, seersucker, nurses'	ea.	3
Cap, service, wool, od	ea.	1
Cape, od, nurses'	ea.	1
Gloves, dress, leather, women's	pr.	1
Gloves, wool, od, women's	pr.	1
Insignia, cap, officers', nurse	ea.	1
Jacket, seersucker, cotton, nurses'	ea.	2
Jacket, wool, od, women's	ea.	2
Necktie, women's	ea.	2
Overcoat, field, women's	ea.	1
Overshoes, low, women's	pr.	1
Raincoat, parka-type, officers', women	ea.	1
Scarf, wool, od, women's	ea.	1
Shoes, service, women's	pr.	2
Skirt, wool, dark, od	ea.	2
Sweater, coat-style, nurses'	ea.	1
Uniform, seersucker, cotton, nurses'	ea.	9
Waist, cotton, women's	ea.	3 ⁸⁷

Finding that the procurement program that had been undertaken in the United Kingdom was not meeting earlier expectations, OCQM cabled the New York port on 17 March 1943 to ship to the Theater by 1 June the gratuitous issue of olive-drab uniforms for 2,000 nurses.⁸⁸ The port replied that nurses' uniforms would not be available until after 1 June and that the number for the European Theater had been reduced to 1,100 in accordance with the actual nurse strength in the United Kingdom at that time.⁸⁹ Whereupon OCQM prepared requisitions for all items of nurses' clothing and sent them



Figure 6.—ETO Nurse in Olive-drab Uniform.




Figure 7.—ETO Nurse in Herringbone Twill Suit.



Figure 8.—ETO Nurse in Poplin Overcoat with Woolen Lining.



Figure 9.—Nurses' and WAC Officers' Olive-drab Uniforms and Overcoats
Authorized for All Military Women.

to the New York port on 18 April and 5 May 1943. Included in the computation were maintenance from 1 July 1943 to 31 December 1943, a 30-day level of supply, and a 45-day special reserve as of 31 December 1943.⁹⁰

On the assumption that nurses would actually change into the new uniforms on 1 July, OCQM cabled again on 11 June, urging that requisitions be filled immediately and saying that no local supply was yet available in the United Kingdom.⁹¹ The port sent assurance that the shipment would begin the latter part of June but said that no uniforms for maintenance could be sent until September.⁹² When it was found in mid-June that the nurse strength in the European Theater had increased to 1,400, OCQM asked that requisitions be increased to meet the new figure.⁹³

The olive-drab uniforms for nurses did not begin to arrive until August. Then, contrary to a request from OCQM, items for the complete initial issue did not come in a single shipment. Because all nurses could not be outfitted simultaneously, the Chief Surgeon was requested to indicate the installations to which priority should be given.⁹⁴ Meanwhile, groups of nurses had the motley appearance that the Nursing Division had sought to prevent, for nurses were coming to the Theater equipped with the new uniforms.⁹⁵

While OCQM was seeking information concerning the basis of issue, it had conferred with the Office of the Chief Surgeon concerning methods of distribution. The Nursing Division had insisted that all nurses should be outfitted at the same time so that there would not be some in olive drab and others in blue. On 5 April 1943 First Lieutenant Esther R. McCafferty asked that OCQM prepare a directive stating when and how requisitions were to be made. She suggested that the Nursing Division file a requisition for the entire quantity needed, allowing latitude to take care of mistakes in numbers and sizes. A unit of a mobile sales store under the direction of a qualified quartermaster officer should deliver the uniforms, letting each installation know as far in advance as possible when it would arrive.⁹⁶ Colonel A. M. Brumbaugh, Chief of the Supply Division, replied that he was studying Lieutenant McCafferty's suggestions.⁹⁷

In August the Deputy Chief Quartermaster recommended that supply officers at medical installations prepare the requisitions for the initial free issue and submit them to depot G-30 in London. The requisitions should be based on individual sizes and should be computed without the use of a distribution factor. The War Department, he said, had directed that nurses

be allowed to keep items of the blue uniforms.⁹⁸ It was finally decided that distribution would be made by two units of a mobile sales store, which would use two 2½-ton trucks and four men. The units would draw the items in bulk from depot G-30 and make distribution by individual fittings. The station quartermaster at each hospital would have advance notice of the unit's arrival. He would give the officer or non-commissioned officer in charge of the unit prompt assistance in unloading trucks and servicing the station.⁹⁹

On 8 September 1943 an emergency mobile sales unit under the supervision of Captain Bond E. Lane was directed to get supplies from depot G-30 and to begin distributing nurses' olive-drab uniforms on 12 September.¹⁰⁰ By 25 September the unit had outfitted in the Eastern Base Section 500 nurses, who declared that the uniform made them very happy. The happiness of other nurses would be postponed, for not all the gratuitous olive-drab items had reached the United Kingdom. The New York port had cabled on 19 September, however, that all items had been shipped.¹⁰¹

As the months came and went, there were nurses in the United Kingdom who would have done well to emulate "patience on a monument, smiling at grief." On 5 February 1944 a number of nurses were still in blue uniforms. At the direction of the Chief Quartermaster, the Chief of the Procurement Division was endeavoring to obtain the items that the Supply Division could not furnish.¹⁰² Nurses who needed items to complete their free issue were asked to sign a certificate provided by the London sales store.¹⁰³ Nurses, physical therapy aids, and hospital dietitians who were unable to be fitted from stocks in depots might apply to the London sales store, which would either fit them from stocks or provide special-measurement items.¹⁰⁴ Thus women in the European Theater of Operations who wore the caduceus of the Medical Department were eventually outfitted in the olive drab of the United States Army.

Inability to fit nurses properly had retarded the issue of uniforms. In the first place, the distribution factor was too small. The Chief of the Supply Division had insisted at the outset that a large distribution factor was necessary in order that uniforms might be issued without considerable alterations. He had asked that the distribution factor for nurses' shoes be 100 percent and for other items of clothing 75 percent. The War Department approved the 100-percent factor for shoes but reduced the factor for other items to 25 percent.¹⁰⁵

Other obstacles cluttered the path of the mobile sales store. It seemed that someone back in the States had pictured nurses as modern Amazons. Therefore, the scarcity of small sizes necessitated the making over of garments. The jacket was badly cut. The overcoat ran large. A size 12 was actually a 14, and a 14, a 16 or larger. The neck measurement of the cotton shirtwaist was out of proportion to the bust measurement. The Chief Quartermaster sent his criticisms to The Quartermaster General on 19 March 1944. He had been able, he said, to outfit the nurses by concentrating stocks in the London area, by employing expert fitters, by providing facilities for major alterations, and by having small uniforms manufactured in the United Kingdom.¹⁰⁶ Despite the great number of large sizes that flooded the sales stores, two nurses were built on such generous proportions that garments could not be altered to fit them—not even those offered by the British women of the Auxiliary Territorial Service. The measurements of the nurse who caused sales store officers the worst headaches were 37 inches at the waist, 44 inches at the bust, and 46 inches at the hips. The Principal Chief Nurse of the 9th Field Hospital requested, therefore, that uniforms for this lieutenant and her runner-up in size be made to order.¹⁰⁷

The Field Uniform

As the training program in the United Kingdom got under way, the uniform issued to nurses was found unsuitable for many types of necessary assignments. Nurses on duty with surgical teams were sent into the field. They rode in unheated vehicles and worked in makeshift operating rooms. The Office of the Chief Surgeon insisted that slacks were needed. They should be made of warm, durable, and washable material. After conferences with representatives of the Nursing Division, OCQM cabled a request to the War Department on 4 November 1942 that trousers be included in the standard equipment of nurses. The Procurement Division sent samples of 10-ounce cotton and woolen material that was considered suitable for the European Theater.¹⁰⁸

Nurses struggled through the wet-cold of an English winter with no field clothing and no field shoes of their own. They borrowed, however, slacks and trousers from military persons of the privileged sex. Young women thus clad, declared the Office of the Chief Surgeon, could not develop that most desirable attribute known as "uniform consciousness." They should have properly fitted field uniforms.¹⁰⁹ When the June sun had dispelled the fogs of spring, the

thoughts of the Chief Surgeon turned toward the winter that he knew to be not far away. The herringbone twill work uniform included in amendment No. 58 to T/BA 21 was not suitable in the European Theater. The Chief Surgeon wrote the Commanding General, SOS, ETOUSA, on 26 June 1943 that every member of the Army Nurse Corps should be equipped with a warm field uniform consisting of a woolen blouse and slacks.¹¹⁰ When the Chief Surgeon's letter was forwarded to OCQM "for information and action,"¹¹¹ the Chief Quartermaster replied, as though the suggestion were new, that the matter would require study.¹¹² After a discussion with Major Robert L. Cohen, however, he directed the Chief of the Procurement Division to obtain the field uniform for nurses.¹¹³ In a few days samples were being assembled for submission to the Supply Division on or about 5 August.¹¹⁴ On 2 September Lieutenant Colonel Thomas B. Phillips, Chief of the Supply Division, reported to Colonel A. M. Brumbaugh, Deputy Chief Quartermaster, that he had received one unsatisfactory sample, which had been returned to the manufacturer. He understood that another sample had been sent to the Procurement Division but had not been received. The package would be traced.¹¹⁵ Colonel Brumbaugh replied that tracing a package would not solve the problem. An officer should be assigned the job of getting field uniforms at once. Otherwise OCQM would surely be criticized.¹¹⁶ The sample that someone had lost was not found but another was obtained.¹¹⁷

A memorandum from the Nursing Division, written on 8 September 1943, served to prod OCQM. Nurses were coming from the zone of interior with woolen anklets, canvas leggings, field shoes, and herringbone twill shirts and trousers. These items had not been included in the original requisitions from OCQM. They should be issued all members of the Army Nurse Corps who were on duty in the European Theater. The memorandum reviewed the long struggle for a field uniform and reminded OCQM that the Nursing Division had never received the sample uniform. About 75 percent of the nurses, or 10,000, should be equipped with the field uniform immediately.¹¹⁸

On 13 September a model of a field uniform had been in the Office of the Chief Surgeon long enough for changes to have been recommended.¹¹⁹ By 21 September the Office of the Chief Surgeon and the Office of the Chief Quartermaster had ironed out all details and manufacturers had been found who would accept contracts to produce the uniforms. The Deputy Chief Quartermaster then recommended that the Chief Surgeon obtain the Theater Com-

mander's approval of the garment and ascertain whether it would be for sale or for gratuitous issue.¹²⁰

In Washington representatives of the Office of The Surgeon General and the Office of The Quartermaster General had been conferring concerning the need for nurses' field uniforms. In August 1943 the Quartermaster Corps Technical Committee approved seersucker slacks and woolen slacks. Though the seersucker slacks were standardized on 28 August, no action was taken on the woolen slacks.¹²¹ The new T/E 21, published on 15 December 1943, listed the olive-drab field jacket and women's cover trousers with woolen inner lining as items of issue to nurses when authorized by a theater commander.¹²²

Meanwhile in the European Theater no further steps had been taken to procure nurses' field uniforms. The Chief Quartermaster on a visit to the United States in December 1943 arranged to have enlisted men's combat clothing shipped to the European Theater for nurses assigned to field operations.¹²³ With women's herringbone twill outfits, which finally reached the Theater, and men's combat clothing, nurses struggled through another winter without the woolen field uniforms they had requested.¹²⁴

The ETO field jacket with matching skirt and slacks proved to be the solution to the nurses' field uniform problem. The story of the development of the ETO uniform is told in volume III, chapter 5, and of its adaptation for issue to women, in chapter 8. By 25 October 1944, 300 army nurses in the Theater had been able to purchase three-piece battle suits—woolen field jacket and matching skirt and slacks. Lieutenant Colonel Ida W. Danielson, in a note of thanks to Major General Littlejohn, said that these were the nurses who most needed field uniforms. "We all love Lieutenant Colonel Cohen," she added, "for his efforts and interest in seeing that the nurses get first consideration in buying these battle-suits."¹²⁵ Fortunately, nurses who were shipped to the Theater in the winter of 1944-1945 were equipped with field clothing.¹²⁶ T/E 21 of 1 January 1945 made mandatory the issue to nurses of an M-1943 field jacket and cover trousers with inner lining.¹²⁷

Long Overcoat

The problem of obtaining a suitable long overcoat for nurses was akin to the field uniform problem. The Chief Quartermaster, summarizing the difficulties he had encountered in outfitting military women, wrote The Quartermaster General that the nurses' standard long overcoat had proved to be neither warm enough

for the United Kingdom nor dressy enough for British cities. A long overcoat similar to that issued to male officers should have been developed for nurses.¹²⁸ To keep the nurses comfortable and happy, the Chief of the Supply Division had suggested to the Chief of the Procurement Division that the London sales store stock overcoat material, which nurses might purchase and have made into overcoats identical with those their brothers in the service were wearing. It was thought that material for about 100 overcoats would be enough for the time being.¹²⁹ When the Chief Nurse expressed the opinion that between 3,000 and 5,000 nurses would want to have the coats made, the Chief of the Supply Division asked the Chief of the Procurement Division to investigate the possibility of purchasing so large an amount of cloth in the United Kingdom.¹³⁰

It was soon apparent that the overcoats could not be manufactured in time to supply all the nurses who wanted them. As an emergency measure, nurses were permitted to purchase male officers' overcoats. Since there were many small nurses in the United Kingdom, the authorization was merely palliative.¹³¹

OQMG learned of the nurses' long overcoat that had been developed in the European Theater and requested samples to be used in connection with a study then under way.¹³² These were delivered to Captain William F. Pounder, OQMG observer, who was visiting the Theater in June 1944.¹³³ Nevertheless, the Office of The Surgeon General adopted the WAC olive-drab woolen overcoat for issue to members of the Army Nurse Corps. Therefore, OCQM requisitioned this item for both Wacs and nurses, to be delivered in November and December 1944.¹³⁴

WOMEN MEDICAL OFFICERS

When the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps was created, women physicians were included in its ranks. In the words of an American woman who had served as a British medical officer in World War I, highly trained specialists were not content to have their services restricted to the care of healthy young women who seldom had ailments more serious than the common cold. In April the Congress, responding to pressure from women's organizations, admitted women physicians to commissions in the Medical Department on equal terms with men.¹³⁵ The few in the European Theater of Operations presented no problem. They wore the uniform of WAC officers and the insignia of the Medical Department. Only the cap was especially designed for them.¹³⁶

OTHER SALES STORE CUSTOMERS

Among sales store customers other than officers of the United States Army were members of the Army Hostess and Librarian Service, American Red Cross workers, accredited newspaper correspondents, United States civilians employed by the Army, and persons brought to the United Kingdom by the United Service Organization. The uniform of the hostess and librarian was developed by OQMG and approved in December 1941.¹³⁷ The winter service uniform consisted of skirt, coat, and cap of blue gabardine. The waist, the black or dark blue oxfords, and the leather gloves of black, gray, or dark blue were of commercial patterns. Among optional items were a trench coat, a blue raincoat, a scarf, a blue sweater, black overshoes, and a black or blue utility bag. The summer uniform was fashioned of blue spun rayon or blue and white seersucker.¹³⁸ In over-

sea theaters, departments, and base commands, the hostess and librarian uniform might be worn by civilian women who were working with the United Service Organization, by those in the employ of the United States Government, and by others whom the commander of the theater accorded authority to wear it.¹³⁹

European Theater Headquarters, however, wanted all persons who were authorized to wear uniforms to be dressed in the olive drab of the United States Army.¹⁴⁰ Hostesses and librarians and Red Cross women in the Theater continued to wear the uniforms of their organizations. The final decision was that other authorized civilian women and all authorized civilian men would wear officers' uniforms and the insignia of the organizations with which they were connected.¹⁴¹ They made their purchases at quartermaster sales stores within the allowances prescribed for officers.

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Figure 10.—Army Hostess in Winter Uniform.



Figure 11.—Red Cross Women in Authorized Uniforms.




Figure 12.—War Correspondent in Officer's Uniform.

CHAPTER 2

SALES STORES ON THE CONTINENT

Sales store problems on the Continent differed from those in the United Kingdom only in degree. The work of both mobile units and static stores increased in volume because of the greater number of customers, the greater wear and tear under field conditions, and the constant movement of the armies.

PREINVASION PLANS

Class II and Class IV plans for the Continental operation were prepared during January and February 1944 and published on 1 March. They outlined the work of the Theater Quartermaster in maintaining the operation and in dispatching supplies to the far shore. They were not intended, however, to be mandatory upon army quartermasters but rather to be guides showing the support that the Chief Quartermaster could give.¹

The Quartermaster Class II and Class IV Plan for an Operation on the Continent set the level of supply for sales store items at 45 days. From D-Day to D-plus-90-day all class IV supplies were to be coordinated with class I shipments and were to be sent to the Continent from depots G-35 in Bristol, G-40 in Barry, G-45 in Thatcham-Newbury, and G-50 in Taunton. After D-plus-90-day the number of depots shipping class IV supplies would depend upon the progress of the closing out of United Kingdom depots. Supplies of officers' and nurses' clothing and accessories would reach the Continent at about D-plus-45-day, when a quartermaster sales company would arrive to operate static sales stores and mobile units. A second company would arrive at about D-plus-90-day. The location of stores and the number of mobile units would be governed by the military situation and the extent of the line of communications. The plan set up model sales store stocks of officers', nurses', and WAC officers' clothing and accessories (see app. VII) and provided also that sales stores would stock American Red Cross uniforms.²

Lieutenant Colonel Albert G. Duncan, Chief of the Plans and Training Division, in sending the plan to Colonel Aloysius M. Brumbaugh, Chief of the Supply Division, explained that before the arrival of sales stores on the Continent officers would be issued clothing from enlisted men's stocks packed in beach maintenance sets and beach follow-up maintenance

sets. These sets, he said, would contain some nurses' articles. He gave assurance that sales stores would be adequately stocked by D-plus-90-day. Each of the first two companies scheduled to arrive would be divided into 12 sections. Mobile units would serve forward areas, and static units would serve rear areas.³ Refinements of the plan provided for five mobile sales companies by D-plus-240-day, one to serve each of the four armies and one to serve the communications zone.⁴

FIRST SALES STORES

Depot supply companies attached to the First United States Army opened sales stores on 14 June at each of the class II and class IV beach dumps.⁵ The five quartermaster sales companies provided for in the preinvasion plans were scheduled to reach the Continent as follows: the 581st on D-plus-16-day, the 58th on D-plus-60-day, the 582d on D-plus-90-day, the 583d on D-plus-120-day, and the 55th on D-plus-240-day. After the departure of the 55th Quartermaster Sales Company, no mobile units would operate in the United Kingdom and the only sales store to be continued would be the one in London.⁶

The 581st Quartermaster Sales Company reached the Continent on 8 July (D-plus-32-day), 16 days behind time, took over the sales stores that had been established at beach dumps, and on 14 July set up a sales store at Isigny, from which it sent two mobile units to visit corps and division areas. In 2 weeks the cash receipts of the store amounted to \$106,-919.05, showing definitely that many officers were in need of its services.⁷

More than 350 tons of clothing for sale to officers was lifted to the Continent between 14 and 25 July. By 9 August model stocks for 10,-000 male officers, 1,000 nurses, and 25 WAC officers were packed and ready for shipment, and arrangements had been made to ship on or about 19 August 357 tons of sales store clothing found to be in excess of requirements in the United Kingdom.⁸ A sales store was opened in Cherbourg on 5 August 1944. Its sales on the first day brought in \$6,000.⁹

At that time the 581st, the 58th, and the 55th were the only sales stores in the Theater, but the 582d and 583d were expected in the near future.¹⁰ The Cheltenham sales store

stopped business on 14 August and started inventorying and packing stock for shipment to the Continent. One officer and six enlisted men of the 58th Quartermaster Sales Company, who had been operating at the Cheltenham store, left at once for the Continent. The remaining 12 enlisted men of the former Cheltenham personnel were assigned to the 55th Quartermaster Sales Company. The sales stores at Liverpool, Bovington, Tidworth, Belfast, and Toome were scheduled to close about 1 September. Their stocks would be transferred to the Continent.¹¹

The Allied armies at that time were making advances beyond the most sanguine expectations. The capture of Pontorson on 1 August had opened a wide corridor into Brittany. United States forces had covered in a single day the 40-mile stretch to Rennes, where they had divided into three columns. By 1 August Allied troops had succeeded in cutting off the Brittany peninsula from the rest of France.

NEW CONTINENTAL PLAN DEVELOPED

The Chief Quartermaster, realizing that officers who had been in combat since early June were in need of clothing and accessories, took stock of the sales store situation. On 16 August he wrote to the Deputy Chief Quartermaster in such concern that his sentences contradicted each other. "The sales store plan is lousy," he said. "If there is one I cannot find it." He had observed that clothing was "being landed any where and being distributed in any direction." A pair of shoes would be "in one place and a pair of pants in another." He wanted all clothing to be sent to Cherbourg by RED BALL express and to be unloaded under the supervision of a quartermaster officer.¹²

Major General Littlejohn's irritation resulted in the immediate development of a sales store plan, which Lieutenant Colonel Thomas B. Phillips presented in tentative draft on 21 August. At that time sales stores were operating at Isigny, UTAH, Carteret, Cherbourg, and Saint Jacques de Nehou; a store was being opened at Communications Zone headquarters; and another would be opened on 25 August at SHAEF headquarters in Granville. According to Lieutenant Colonel Phillips' proposed plan, as soon as the armies should move out of these areas, other stores would be established in Reims, Brest, Saint Nazaire, Tours, Orleans, and Paris. Each section or base section would have one central sales store, which would operate substores. The largest sales store would be in Paris. Civilian personnel, which had proved entirely satisfactory in Cherbourg,

would be used at sales stores throughout the Continent.

The plan provided that the Cherbourg depot would be the central storage point for sales store items and would issue supplies to other depots for distribution to stores. Model stocks would be furnished each store. The Chief Quartermaster would allocate items monthly to armies, sections, base sections, and ADSEC, giving priority to combat units.

Enough clothing was then in the European Theater of Operations to provide every officer by 31 December one service coat, two pairs of trousers, one shirt, and four pairs of socks. A 15-day supply of low-quarter shoes was on hand, and a shipment of shoes was said to be enroute. A 40-day supply of officers' clothing and a 65-day supply of nurses' and WAC officers' clothing were being discharged on the Continent. Items that were in short supply had been requisitioned from the New York Port of Embarkation.¹³

CREDIT SYSTEM ESTABLISHED

On 22 August 1944 OCQM published the procedure for controlling and requisitioning sales store items. The credit system upon which it was based has been called a subterfuge for stock control. ADSEC had proposed it on 28 May 1944 in the Standing Operating Procedure published for the supply of units supported by Communications Zone installations and for the wholesale supply of armies. Credits, which were similar to commercial checking accounts, would be established in depots.¹⁴ The procedure of 22 August worked out the application of the plan to sales store operation. On the first of each month the Chief Quartermaster would instruct the depot at Cherbourg to set aside a definite amount of sales store stock for each army, section, and base section, against which supplies would be drawn. Army commanders would requisition for all officers in their areas. Sales stores would send requisitions to their base section commanders, who would submit consolidated requests to the Cherbourg depot. Army requirements would always receive first priority.¹⁵

Colonel Harold M. Florsheim's request that the issue of credits clear through the Storage and Distribution Division¹⁶ met with the immediate approval of the Chief of the Sales Store Branch of the Supply Division, which appointed an officer to maintain liaison with the Storage and Distribution Division.¹⁷ It was decided that credits would be established only for items of the officer's service uniform.¹⁸

Instructions dealing with details of operation were published on 3 September. Then sales stores were doing business in Cherbourg, Isigny, Valognes, and Barneville, and one was about to be opened in Le Mans. Upon approval of the Chief Quartermaster, commanding officers of base sections were authorized to activate and close stores in accordance with their requirements. The instructions were explicit as to signs to be placed on highways indicating the location of the stores and as to signs to be placed within the stores indicating departments. Model 30-day stock lists for 10,000 officers and 1,000 nurses and WAC officers had been sent to all the existing sales stores.¹⁹

NEW OVER-ALL PLAN

The ink on the Continental plan was scarcely dry before the Chief Quartermaster wrote the Deputy Chief Quartermaster that he wanted an over-all sales store plan that would include the United Kingdom. It was to be "more than a piece of paper," he said. Because the Supply Division had paid too little attention to the sales store problem, he and Lieutenant Colonel Cohen had had to give much of their time to a job that should have been done by the Sales Store Branch.²⁰

Therefore, the Chief of the Supply Division worked up another plan, which he submitted on 4 September. He had been wise enough to consult Lieutenant Colonel Cohen. Three types of stores were to be operated. The class A stores would be patterned after metropolitan department stores and would be somewhat in the nature of show places. They would carry ready-to-wear items and provide many services such as tailoring and shoe repairing. Class A stores were planned for London, Cherbourg, Paris, Coblenz, and Berlin. Class B stores would be similar to class A but less elaborate. There would be 10 of these, all serving sections and base sections. Class C stores, which would be wholly utilitarian, would be placed at base depots and stocked with essential items. On the priority list for September were 250 tons of sales store supplies. For the opening of the Paris sales store, stocks were then being moved by rail and truck and a 50-ton air lift had been requested.²¹

Soon after receiving the plan, the Chief Quartermaster declared that five sales companies were needed at once for the opening of city stores in Cherbourg, Paris, Metz, and Coblenz. "I am being bombarded in all directions," he said, "to get sales stores started."²²

PARIS SALES STORE

Yet for some time Lieutenant Colonel Phillips, with the willing assistance of Lieutenant Colonel Cohen, had been laying large plans for the Paris sales store. Lieutenant Colonel Cohen sent the plan to Major General Littlejohn on 22 August. He described a proposed "Com Z Sales and Service Center in greater Paris" as similar to Harrod's or Selfredges in London, which are somewhat more elegant than the American store of his civilian experience. A single building covering a city block would house all departments, which would be outfitted with fixtures of the finest French design. The establishment would have three divisions—one operated by the Army Exchange Service, one by the Quartermaster Service, and one by other services in the Theater that complemented the functions of the Army Exchange Service. The men's clothing store and the women's clothing store would have custom tailoring and alteration sections. There would be an officers' barber shop, an enlisted men's barber shop, a beauty shop, snack bar, gift shop, post office, travel bureau, ticket office, trans-Atlantic passport office, billeting office, finance office, telephone exchange, first-aid station, game room, pay room, and sections for such services as laundry, dry cleaning, and shoe repairing.²³

Major General Littlejohn wrote Lieutenant Colonel Phillips on 28 August that a committee of officers should be appointed at once to select the site, arrange for occupancy, and begin necessary alterations within the building. The committee should consist of a colonel, appointed by the Chief Quartermaster, and one field-grade officer from each of the following organizations: the Army Exchange Service, the Theater Special Services Division, the Finance Department, the Theater Adjutant General's Office, the Quartermaster Service, the American Red Cross, and the London sales store. Because experience in London had shown that a store operated almost entirely by civilian labor is not as neat and clean as one operated by army personnel, 24 enlisted men and 1 officer should be detailed to maintain the appearance of the store and to assure the keeping of adequate stock control records. These men would supervise the 100 or so civilians, who would actually do the work.²⁴ In reply Lieutenant Colonel Phillips recommended that the officer chosen to head the committee get in touch with the other services and organizations for the purpose of selecting committee members.²⁵

The Paris sales store opened on 28 September, exactly a month after the exchange of letters between Major General Littlejohn and

Lieutenant Colonel Phillips. On 12 September the 583d Quartermaster Sales Company had been assigned to assist in the operation of the store. A building had been selected at No. 3 Avenue Friedland in the Champs Elysees and Arc de Triomphe district. Formerly occupied by a bank, it had been taken over by the Germans and used to store about 650 tons of propaganda material for distribution throughout occupied countries. American souvenir collectors, allowed to help themselves, brought home many of the books, pamphlets, woodcuts, and pictures for the doubtful benefit of their posterity. First, however, 25 French trucks and 13 United States Army vehicles had worked day and night for 2½ weeks hauling away Hitler's 4-year accumulation of material. On opening day the 583d Quartermaster Sales Company was assisted by 29 French civilians, whose number was soon increased to 47.²⁶ The great department store, however, did not materialize. In other words, all sales and services to officers in Paris were not centered under one roof.

LIMITED NUMBER OF SALES STORES

While plans for the Paris sales stores were crystalizing, the Quartermaster of the Loire Base Section discovered to his dismay that the plan for the establishment of a sales store in Le Mans had been abandoned. If there was no chance of getting the project restored, he suggested that a sales section be opened at the Le Mans depot.²⁷ The Chief Quartermaster was adamant in his decision to have sales stores only in London, Cherbourg, Paris, and two other cities selected from a list that contained only the names of Coblenz, Metz, Nancy, Liege, and Reims. Tentative plans provided that a platoon of a sales company would be assigned to the Loire Base Section. The Deputy Chief Quartermaster thought there would be no objection to having a sales section in the Le Mans depot.²⁸

The Commanding General of the Loire Base Section then took up the cudgel. He reminded the Commanding General of the Communications Zone that early plans had called for a sales store in Le Mans, where he thought one was more needed than in Cherbourg. Why not set up a sales store to meet the emergency even though it would have to be moved later?²⁹ The answer that OCQM sent on 9 October was direct and to the point. Sales stores could not be established in all base sections because there were not enough supplies on the Continent to stock them. The Paris store, limited as it was, served only combat troops. The Deputy Chief Quartermaster suggested that needs of officers and other authorized persons in the Loire Base Section be met by selling depot stocks.³⁰ The

Chief Quartermaster put an end to the correspondence on 19 October by means of a personal letter to the Commanding General of the Loire Base Section. He politely expressed regret that a static store could not be established in Le Mans, explaining that sales store items were unavailable because of their low shipping priority.³¹

A plan for providing sales store service in Norway was developed in November 1944. Coincidental with the OVERLORD plan for invasion of Norway, an occupational plan known as RANKIN Case C had been developed for use if Germany should become weakened in the winter of 1943-44. Within the framework of RANKIN Case C two other plans had been developed. RANKIN Case C (Norway) provided for the establishment of Allied control in Norway upon the unconditional surrender of Germany and was to be carried out by a task force given the code name of NIGHTLIGHT. RANKIN Case C provided for the occupation of "certain areas on the Continent in the event of a German withdrawal" and was to be carried out by a task force that was given the code name of LIGAMENT. (See vol. I, ch. 1.) On 10 November 1944 the Deputy Chief Quartermaster submitted to Colonel G. H. Wilson, G-3 of the Communications Zone, a plan for establishing sales stores in Norway. The model stock was set up on the basis of 400 officers. Maintenance for such a small number of officers, however, could not be provided in ample tariff sizes, but a small depot stock of sales store items would be kept on hand for emergency replacements. The 14 nurses and 5 Red Cross workers who were to accompany the task forces would carry with them items for replacement. When other articles of clothing were needed, requisition would be made by specific sizes.³² Colonel Wilson later suggested that nurses and Red Cross workers be permitted to purchase and take with them sufficient clothing to last for a 6-month period, and OCQM concurred with the plan.³³ Though the RANKIN plans were never used, the stock earmarked for NIGHTLIGHT and LIGAMENT helped to deplete sales store supplies.

Not all the requests for sales stores, therefore, could be granted. The Deputy Chief of the SHAEF Mission in Belgium wrote on 23 November 1944 asking that a store be established to serve the needs of 225 officers and persons of relative rank.³⁴ The Deputy Chief Quartermaster replied that the limited number of sales companies precluded the possibility of setting up a sales store to serve the SHAEF Mission in Belgium and suggested that the store in Namur be used.³⁵ When the 130th Replacement




Figure 13.—Sales Store near the Beaches.



Figure 14.—Interior of a Sales Store.




Figure 15.—Interior of a Class B Sales Store on the Continent.



Figure 16.—Nurses' Sales Store in the Field.

Battalion, Army Air Forces, requested a sales store because officers were sent from the zone of interior with insufficient clothing and were immediately alerted,³⁶ authority was granted to establish the store.³⁷

No sales store was opened in the Channel Base Section until early January 1945. Then, in response to an earnest request from the quartermaster of the section, one platoon of the 58th Quartermaster Sales Company was assigned and authority was granted to establish sales store facilities. The stock was limited, and sales were generally restricted to combat ground and flying personnel. Officers stationed in the communications zone were permitted to purchase only upon certification that they were in dire need.³⁸

SUPPLY TO THE ARMIES

The Twelfth Army Group, which consisted of the First United States Army and the Third United States Army and to which the Ninth United States Army was added, was created on 1 August 1944, the day that the Third United States Army became operational.³⁹ Almost at once complaints of sales store inadequacy came from the group. The Chief Quartermaster explained that there simply were not enough sales companies, because the War Department had not granted the number originally requested by the Theater. Consequently, it had not been possible to allocate a sales company to each field army. The Chief Quartermaster recommended that two platoons of the 581st Quartermaster Sales Company be withdrawn from the First Army, one to be assigned to the Third Army and the other to the Ninth Army.⁴⁰

The unhappiness of the armies was reported to G-4 by the Communications Zone Liaison Officer. The metropolitan sales store could be of no service to officers in the field.⁴¹ The First United States Army, then pressing toward Aachen, and the Third United States Army, clawing across the Moselle River, could make little use of sales stores in London, Cherbourg, and Paris.

Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley, Commanding General of the Twelfth Army Group, agreeing to borrow platoons from Peter to pay Paul, said that he accepted Major General Littlejohn's recommendation as a temporary expedient but that he wanted one sales company attached to each army as soon as possible. The records in the Twelfth Army Group headquarters showed that five companies were already in the Theater and that the 582d and the 583d Quartermaster Sales Companies would soon arrive.⁴² In replying on 24 September, OCQM

stated that on 30 August when the recommendation for the loan of the platoons was made, the 581st Quartermaster Sales Company, working with the First Army, and a platoon of the 55th Quartermaster Sales Company, working with SHAEF, constituted the entire sales company personnel on the Continent. Subsequently, the 582d and the 583d Quartermaster Sales Companies, another platoon of the 55th Quartermaster Sales Company, and the cadre of the 58th Quartermaster Sales Company had arrived; and the War Department had agreed to send still another sales company at a date not yet designated. Though there appeared to be five companies then on the Continent, one consisted of a cadre building up to full strength. The platoon working at SHAEF headquarters could not fulfill its normal mission. If each army then operative should be given a sales company, only the cadre of one company and two platoons of another company would be left to the entire communications zone, including the United Kingdom. The 582d Quartermaster Sales Company would be attached to the Twelfth Army Group to be divided between the Third and Ninth Armies.⁴³

Meanwhile, the platoon of the 581st Quartermaster Sales Company that had been taken from the First United States Army and attached to the Third United States Army had such small stock as to be almost useless. The Quartermaster Section of the Twelfth Army Group was cheered on 24 September by the news that relief was in sight.⁴⁴ Trucks and trailers of the 583d Quartermaster Sales Company had been sent west to join detachments of the 582d Quartermaster Sales Company. Both companies would proceed in convoy to Cherbourg and pick up about 80 tons of clothing, which would be allocated to the Quartermaster of the Third United States Army.⁴⁵

Complaints of limited stocks or no stocks at all continued to reach OCQM. Nurses had been wailing since early September about the absence of field clothing and declaring that purchases by USO and Red Cross women and civilian nurses had contributed to the shortages.⁴⁶ The situation with regard to Third Army nurses became so acute in October that authorization was received for the use of aircraft to transport nurses' clothing from the United Kingdom to Toul.⁴⁷

The Chief of the Supply Division wrote on 9 October that shipments to the First and Third United States Armies, ADSEC, and the Seine Section had practically exhausted stocks of officers', nurses', WAC officers', and Red Cross clothing and accessories. Supplies should be got to the Continent at once, he said.⁴⁸ The Chief

Quartermaster wrote G-4 on 10 October that efforts to move sales store items by Liberty ships had proved entirely unsatisfactory. Stocks had been scattered in several depots and could not be collected in one point because transportation was lacking. It was mandatory, he said, that items be moved in balanced tariffs. The 2,500 tons of officers' clothing then in the United Kingdom should be brought to the Continent by LST immediately.⁴⁹

Colonel Andrew T. McNamara, Quartermaster of the First United States Army, wrote a letter on 12 October that was not of the sort to brighten the Chief Quartermaster's day. An officer, equipped with 10 trucks and trailers, had been sent from the Office of the First Army Quartermaster in quest of sales store supplies. Upon reaching the OCQM Sales Store Branch in Paris, he had been told to come back the next day, since a colonel with an introduction from Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee was getting attention. The next morning the officer who had been sent from the First Army received three distribution directives—one on OMAHA, one on UTAH, and one on WATSON. Several items on his requisition, however, were zeroed. He got three truckloads at OMAHA, nothing at UTAH, and one truckload at Watson. At the three ports he was told that much of the merchandise on the requisitions had been shipped to Paris. He could get no paratroop boots or combat clothing on his requisition, though the items were being sold at the OMAHA sales store. None of the following items, all much needed by officers of the First Army, were available: small and medium combat jackets, medium combat trousers, parachutists' jumper boots, winter pajamas, thick woolen socks, officers' field coats, sweaters, and insignia of rank. Colonel McNamara added this postscript to his letter: "This is not to be considered a gripe but more or less what we see constantly. It is really difficult to explain to Divisions that combat clothing is out of production when it is for sale in rear stores. I have the sales slip for Lt. Johnson's purchase of combat clothing."⁵⁰ The Deputy Chief Quartermaster sent Colonel McNamara's letter to the Supply Division and asked that a complete investigation be made at once.⁵¹

CORRECTIVE MEASURES

Major General Littlejohn, utterly exasperated, wrote Colonel John B. Franks on 27 October that he was hearing too often complaints concerning the failure of the Quartermaster Service to provide combat officers with the things they needed. As the first corrective step, he wanted Lieutenant Jennings, an efficient

WAC officer then in the United Kingdom Base, brought to the Continent and placed in the Sales Store Branch of the Supply Division. Next he wanted a complete review of the stock situation. The Cherbourg and OMAHA stores, which seemed to be the greatest offenders, should be scrutinized. Perhaps all items should be withdrawn from these stores, except underwear, enlisted persons' clothing, and women officers' items other than outer garments. The Procurement Division and the Sales Store Branch of the Supply Division, working together, should be directed to live with the sales store problem until a solution could be found. Major General Littlejohn was not certain that sufficient restrictions had been imposed on purchases in the United Kingdom.⁵²

On 30 October Major General Littlejohn poured out his troubles in a letter to Brigadier General Alexander N. Owens, Director of the Storage and Distribution Division, OQMG. Losses and pilferage on the Continent had been very high. Because of the wear and tear under field conditions, he had had to make to the armies bulk shipments of officers' and nurses' clothing. Lack of dry-cleaning and laundry facilities in the field necessitated a larger distribution than he had anticipated in preinvasion planning. Many critical items long ago requisitioned from the United States had not reached the Theater.⁵³

High consumption of sales store items was not a problem peculiar to the European Theater. An officer who had been through the North African, Sicilian, and Italian campaigns before taking part in the Battle of France, said that an officer in combat required a new field uniform every 2 months and two service uniforms a year. Upon that basis the Chief Quartermaster estimated his requirements of officers' clothing through 31 March 1945.⁵⁴

The scarcity of competent tailors to work on necessary alterations both in static stores and with mobile sales companies added to the acuteness of the clothing shortage. The Chief Quartermaster suggested that 400 tailors from prisoner-of-war ranks be placed with quartermaster salvage-repair units for training and that they be transferred later to quartermaster sales companies. He suggested also that 10 expert French tailors be employed as instructors.⁵⁵ The Chief of the Personnel Division feared that as many as 400 tailors could not be handled by the salvage-repair units and that the language barrier would stand in the way of French instructors' giving Germans adequate training.⁵⁶ The Chief of the Installations Division countered by suggesting that the task be undertaken jointly by the static salvage instal-

lations and the salvage-repair companies.⁵⁷ The Personnel Division then asked if 400 prisoners could be properly guarded and suggested the use of prisoners of war already trained by the 64th Quartermaster Base Depot.⁵⁸ A compromise plan was finally developed. The 64th Quartermaster Base Depot would train 150 prisoners of war, whom the Supply Division might use at the depot or transfer to other locations. If additional tailors were needed, the Installations Division would seek to obtain them from among prisoners of war.⁵⁹

RATIONING

When sales stores were first opened on the Continent, no restrictions were imposed on purchases. Officers went on the spending orgy that all Americans indulge in when their pockets bulge with money. They bought for themselves articles they did not need—"a new trousseau every 30 days," the Chief Quartermaster declared. What was even more to be deplored, they bought articles that they sold to enlisted men and civilians. In addition, sales store personnel reserved popular items for their personal friends. The Chief Quartermaster declared that such practices as these had to stop.⁶⁰

Stock in the London store was so low in September 1944 that a restrictive program to curb wildcat buying was adopted. Quantities half the size of those that had been sold daily were put out each morning. When stocks were exhausted, the store was closed.⁶¹ It seemed fair, when the Paris store was opened, to restrict sales of its too limited stock to members of combat units and to flying personnel.⁶² Nevertheless, sales stores on the Continent could not be opened more than 2 days a week, because the demand was many times greater than the supply. The Chief Quartermaster argued that the strain on sales stores would be lessened if officers should reach the Theater with full equipment. At a dinner attended by the chief nurses of the several armies, he discussed the problem. One of the chief nurses told him that nurses did not bring enough clothing from the United States. She thought, however, that they should not be given priority over nurses who had been in the Theater several months.⁶³

A card rationing system was adopted in January 1945. As early as 5 December 1944 Major General Everett S. Hughes wrote Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee that in his opinion the time had come to cease discriminating against communications zone officers, who were unhap-

py because they were denied the clothing they needed. Lieutenant General Lee sent the memorandum to G-1 and G-4 with a handwritten note in which he pronounced the advice to be sound.⁶⁴ G-1 thought that sales store policies should be changed, for many officers in the communications zone had been without sales store facilities for a number of months. If items were limited, they should be rationed and not sold only to combat officers.⁶⁵

Circular No. 8, ETOUSA, published on 21 January 1945, gave the decisive answer. Uniforms, other clothing, and accessories would be sold by quartermaster sales stores, mobile sales units, or depots only on presentation of ration cards. The clothing and accessories that could be purchased are shown in appendix VIII. The following persons were authorized to receive cards:

- United States Army officers (including warrant officers, flight officers, nurses, and WAC officers)
- United States Navy officers attached to the Army
- American Red Cross personnel
- Civilian technicians attached to the Army
- Allied officers attached to the Army
- United Service Organization personnel
- United States war correspondents
- Air Transport Command contract pilots
- War Shipping Administration personnel
- British civilian volunteers attached to United States forces
- United States civilians attached to United States embassies
- Allied Expeditionary Forces Club personnel
- Other personnel authorized by Theater headquarters.⁶⁶

Colonel Everett Busch, Third Army Quartermaster, protested that the plan was not worth the trouble it would impose upon the armies, which were already overburdened by records, reports, and special forms. If control was exercised through orders limiting the amount an officer might buy, he thought that there would be little chiseling.⁶⁷ The Chief Quartermaster replied that Colonel Busch evidently did not have the facts. When rationing was lifted in the United Kingdom in the summer of 1944, much of the Continental stock was sold in 30 days and it had been necessary to close the London store. The Paris store ran completely out during the first week of its operation. Rationing was the only way to protect fighting elements and prevent troops in the rear and civilians from cleaning out the sales stores.⁶⁸

CONTINENTAL SUPPLY PLANS

The credit system, by which sales store items had been requisitioned since 22 August 1944, was abolished on 5 December for all types of supplies. Thereafter the army quartermasters prepared requisitions for 10-day periods and sent them to OCQM, which made allocations. The armies received priority of supply.⁶⁹

The quartermaster supply and storage plan of 30 October 1944 had provided that sales store items be stocked in the Paris intermediate depot for the supply of all armies, sections, and base sections.⁷⁰ When the quartermaster supply and storage plan of 1 December 1944 was published, sales store items were still to be concentrated in Paris because of their limited supply and the difficulties connected with handling them. The Paris depot, therefore, stored sales store supplies for the entire Continent and made bulk shipments to armies, sections, and base sections and held a 40-day level of supply.⁷¹

Among the changes provided in the quartermaster supply and storage plan of 20 January 1945 was the establishment of a depot in Le Havre for all types of supplies except fuels and lubricants. The Theater reserve of sales store supplies was to be held as follows: 25 percent in the Lille depot, 25 percent in the Reims depot, and 50 percent in the Paris depot. A 45-day Theater level of officers' clothing would be held as follows: in the Lille depot for 35,000 officers, in the Reims depot for 35,000 officers, and in the Paris depot for 70,000 officers. The Le Havre depot would serve personnel processed through the Le Havre-Rouen, or RED HORSE, staging area. It would hold an initial issue of clothing for 5,000 officers, 500 nurses, and 250 WAC officers.⁷²

The RED HORSE staging area had been set up in the vicinity of Le Havre and Rouen to process all troops arriving on the Continent and all troops leaving the Continent for the United Kingdom or the United States.⁷³ On 4 January 1945 the Chief Quartermaster authorized the establishment of a sales store at Le Havre and sent a model-stock list providing a 30-day maintenance for 20,000 officers. Sales to officers leaving the Continent would not be governed by Theater restrictions but would be limited to quantities that an officer needed in order to make a "presentable appearance."⁷⁴ The Chief Quartermaster wrote the Quartermaster of the Channel Base Section on 8 January 1945 as follows: "The importance of the sales store you are establishing in the RED HORSE area cannot be emphasized too strongly. It is a means through which the Quartermaster Service can distinguish itself by rendering exceptional serv-

ices to those officers and men returning to the United States." The sales store should provide special tailoring and fitting facilities capable of giving prompt service to each officer passing through the area. All officers going to the United States or the United Kingdom, but no other officers, would have a chance to purchase complete ETO uniforms.⁷⁵

Simultaneous with the publication of the storage and supply plan of 20 January 1945, Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General of the Army Service Forces, visited the European Theater of Operations to observe the functioning of the supply program. He prefaced his report by saying that the accomplishments of the Communications Zone had been outstanding and represented one of the major achievements of the war, but he suggested a few changes that he believed necessary to efficiency. Adequate provisions, he said, had not been made for organizing the depots "in depth" or for coordinating personnel, facilities, supplies, and transportation to bring about an orderly flow from the United States through the ports to the depots and thence through the regulating stations to the armies. In other words, he wanted supplies to travel in a straight line from a base depot at the port to an intermediate depot and an advance depot and thence to the troops.⁷⁶ The general staff and special sections of the Theater began at once to devise a plan founded on the principle of "supply in depth."

The quartermaster supply and storage plan that fitted into the new program was issued in February and March 1945 in the form of memorandums to section and base section quartermasters. When the first of these memorandums was published, the United States armies were approaching the Rhine; but, before the last was published, Cologne, the Saar basin, Mainz, Ludwigshaven, Saarbrücken, and Coblenz had fallen into the Allied hands. Sales store missions were given to the depots in Paris, Reims, Lille-Mons, and Marseille. The Theater reserve of sales store supplies would be divided among these depots. The Paris depot would ship to other depots and armies. Until the Lille-Mons depot could be sufficiently stocked, the Reims depot would continue to ship to all armies, sections, and base sections. It would hold a 45-day level of supply for 35,000 officers. The Lille-Mons depot would serve the First and Ninth Armies, portions of ADSEC, and the Channel Base Section and would hold a 45-day level of clothing for 35,000 officers. The Marseille depot would store sales store supplies off-loaded at Marseille and would serve the Seventh United States Army and the French First



Figure 17.—Exterior of the Berlin Sales Store.



Figure 18.—Interior of the Berlin Sales Store.

Army. It would hold a 45-day level of supply for the Continental Advance Section, the Delta Base Section, and the Seventh United States Army.⁷⁷ Other depots that would distribute sales store items as directed by section commanders were the Verdun depot, the Liege depot, the Antwerp distributing point, the Nancy-Metz depot, and the Dijon depot.⁷⁸

CHANGES IN PROCEDURE

In February 1945, when the Southern Line of Communications (SOLOC) went out of existence, the European Theater of Operations encountered several problems relating to differences in the procedure established for the supply of the southern armies.

On 1 November 1944 the European Theater had assumed supply responsibility for the Sixth United States Army Group. This group, commanded by Lieutenant-General Jacob L. Devers, consisted of the Seventh United States Army, the French First Army, and several divisions of French colonial troops. Initially, this group, which had invaded southern France, had been supplied by the North African Theater of Operations, which became the Mediterranean Theater of Operations on 1 November 1944. However, when the Sixth Army Group reached the Belfort Gap, the Supreme Commander realized that the line of communications from North African bases was too long and that the force could be supplied more easily by the European Theater. Consequently, the Continental Advance Section (CONAD), the supply organization of the Sixth Army Group, was transferred to the Communications Zone.⁷⁹ Thus, a second advance section was added to the supply structure.

On 20 November 1944 the Communications Zone of the European Theater absorbed SOLOC, which had been the Communications Zone first of the North African Theater and then of the Mediterranean Theater.⁸⁰ Nevertheless, SOLOC continued to use procedures that had been adopted by NATOUSA and MTOUSA. On 12 February SOLOC went out of existence.⁸¹ Then it seemed that uniformity of procedure should be adopted throughout the Theater.

In SOLOC officers' clothing had been handled by the Army Exchange Service, and in the rest of the Theater by the Quartermaster Service. The Army Exchange Service had added 2 percent to cover overhead expenses and losses, and the Quartermaster Service had added 3 percent. After the dissolution of SOLOC the Chief of the Supply Service thought that prices should be equalized.⁸² The Army Exchange Service

agreed to lift the mark-up to 3 percent while the Communications Zone was studying the possibility of entirely eliminating the overhead charge.⁸³ On 13 March OCQM announced that after 1 May all authorized sales of clothing and equipage in the European Theater of Operations would be made at cost without the addition of an overhead charge.⁸⁴

The next day the credit system was reestablished for sales store items. Standing Operating Procedure No. 7 of 2 February 1945 had authorized the Commanding General of ADSEC to reestablish credits for controlled items.⁸⁵ The Chief Quartermaster then classified sales store supplies as controlled items because of their restricted use and issued credits to each commander. Depots receiving requisitions from units whose credits had been exhausted made appeal to OCQM for final action. Unused credits were automatically canceled at the end of each month.⁸⁶

MISSION ACCOMPLISHED

The sales store situation showed considerable improvement in the spring of 1945, for on 14 February the War Department agreed to comply with Major General Littlejohn's oft-repeated request that officers be sent to the Theater with sufficient clothing to meet their requirements for a 4-month period.⁸⁷ On VE-day static sales stores were operating in London, Paris, Versailles, Fontainebleau, Le Havre, Antwerp, Brussels, Cherbourg, Rennes, Cannes, Marseille, Deauville, Nancy, and Dijon.⁸⁸

The sales stores on the Continent had continued to serve men and women officers of the Army and the other groups that had been authorized to make purchases during the static period in the United Kingdom. Another considerable group of customers had been added after D-day. On 19 February 1943 British civilian women drivers had been authorized to purchase uniforms from quartermaster sales stores and to wear them with their own identifying insignia.⁸⁹ During the static period no other British civilians made purchases at sales stores.⁹⁰ In June 1944 G-1 requested OCQM to initiate action to procure the blue uniform of hostess and librarian for 250 civilian women who would be employed on the Continent. Because this uniform was stocked for only a few women and because its procurement for so large a number as 250 could not be accomplished in less than 90 days, OCQM recommended that the service uniform of nurses or Wacs be authorized.⁹¹ The recommendation having been accepted, the British civilian women were permitted to make the following purchases:

Item	Unit	Quantity
Bag, hand, cloth	ea.	1
Blouse or jacket, wool	ea.	2
Cap, garrison, EM	ea.	2
Gloves, wool	pr.	1
Necktie, black, EM	ea.	2
Overcoat, field	ea.	1
Shoes, service, low	pr.	2
Skirt, wool	ea.	2
Stockings, cotton	pr.	4
Towel	ea.	3
Waist, cotton	ea.	5
Waist, wool	ea.	2
Washcloth	ea.	2

Brassieres, girdles, panties, vests, and slips would be available after 1 January, and the following items might be purchased on memorandum receipt: raincoat, helmet, mess gear, protective clothing, British-made duffel bag, and identification necklace and tag.⁹² By 10 January 1945 the number of British civilian women authorized to make purchases had increased to 528.⁹³

POST HOSTILITIES

Post-VE-day planning was begun in December 1944 just before the German offensive in the Ardennes postponed the Allied victory. Realizing that the cessation of hostilities would bring about a greater demand for officers' clothing, OCQM made a 60 percent increase in requisitions for sized clothing and directed the Supply Division to study VE-day requirements.⁹⁴ Officers had taken only field uniforms to forward areas. Much of the baggage that had been left behind had deteriorated or had been lost. The Deputy Chief Quartermaster thought, therefore, that two service uniforms per officer should be requisitioned.⁹⁵

The Chief Quartermaster resorted to more explosive tactics. While the battle of Bastogne was at the peak of its fury, he wrote The Quartermaster General that the problems of supplying clothing to officers and to enlisted men were no longer separate issues.⁹⁶ He said he had promised all soldiers on the Continent ETO uniforms and they were going to get them.⁹⁷ Because it was clear that officers would want new uniforms once the fighting was over, Major General Littlejohn urged that the cloth he had requested be sent as quickly as possible. The development of the ETO uniform and the outcome of the well-intended but ill-fated program to manufacture these uniforms in Europe is told in volume III, chapter 5.

The problem of clothing United States forces after VE-day assumed large proportions. It was complicated by an attempt to issue khaki clothing to forces being redeployed to the South Pacific and by the desire of field-force commanders to dress occupational forces in the height of military fashion. At the same time the necessity to provide for dependent groups in Europe created a clothing problem second to none in United States military experience. Volume IX of this series deals with supply to dependent groups and Volume X with redeployment.

Coincidental with the signing of the final terms of surrender, the Chief Quartermaster returned from a trip to the forward areas in Germany. He wrote immediately to G-4 saying that the prompt establishment of depots in Germany was imperative.⁹⁸ By the middle of May United States areas of occupation had been established, the Bremen-Bremerhaven enclave had been carved from the British zone, and the services had been authorized to obtain release of facilities by dealing directly with the armies.⁹⁹ Sales stores then took their place in the supply program for the army of occupation. Major General Littlejohn planned at once to establish at the American headquarters in Germany a sales store patterned after the one in Paris, which had taken care of the majority of the officers on the Continent. The principal sales store in Germany should stock cloth and findings as well as finished garments.¹⁰⁰ By 22 June the United States zone in Germany had been divided into the Western Military District, the Eastern Military District, and the Berlin District, and the missions of their depots had been defined.¹⁰¹ On 23 July the Chief Quartermaster directed that the best sales store be set up at Frankfurt, the headquarters of the Theater Service Forces, European Theater; and that at least one sales store be set up in the other districts and in the Bremen-Bremerhaven enclave. Brigadier General John B. Franks was designated the task of working out details in conjunction with the armies.¹⁰²

Until November 1945 Major General Littlejohn continued to direct the activities of the Quartermaster Service, with headquarters first in Paris and then in Frankfurt. When he was relieved as Chief Quartermaster, he turned over to Colonel Joseph C. Odell a supply system that was serving the needs of officers and enlisted persons of the United States occupational forces.

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Figure 19.—A Mobile Post Exchange in the United Kingdom.



Figure 20.—A Soldier Purchasing His Weekly Ration at a Post Exchange in England.



Figure 21.—The Components of the Gratuitous Issue in Marshaling Areas.



Figure 22.—Soldiers Receiving Daily Gratuitous Issues in Marshaling Areas.

POST EXCHANGES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

The Army Exchange Service is the outgrowth of a practice that flourished in the armies of the world for almost 300 years. Sutlery, as it was called, was an accepted part of British army life in the days of Queen Elizabeth. So well was it entrenched, in fact, that in 1590 each garrison was required to keep a list of the sutlers who served it. Though the word is of Dutch extraction and originally meant one of humble occupation, early English dictionaries defined a sutler as a person who followed an army or lived in a garrison town and sold provisions to soldiers.

Sutlery and its evils entered American history during the French and Indian Wars. The original rules and articles of war for the Continental Army passed by the Congress on 20 September 1775 allowed sutlers to bring into military garrisons any quantity of provisions, "eatable or drinkable," except when contracts had been entered into by the Government. Sutlers were not permitted to open their shops before reveille or to stay open after 9 o'clock at night. Neither were they allowed to open during church services on Sundays. Sutlers were an avaricious lot. Alexander Hamilton expressed his contempt for Benedict Arnold in these words: "This man is in every sense despicable.... He practiced every dirty act of speculation, and even stooped to connections with the sutlers of the garrison to defraud the public."¹

In 1862 sutlers were appointed to the Volunteer Service of the Union Army. The inspectors general of the army constituted a board of officers who prescribed the goods sutlers might sell. The articles ranged from apples to shirt buttons. The sale of liquor was prohibited. The commanding officer, the surgeon, the quartermaster, and the commissary officer of each brigade fixed prices. They selected one sutler for each regiment, who was given a monopoly on all trade. In return, a small part of his profit, usually 10 cents per soldier, went to the regimental fund for social activities. Sutlers could sell merchandise to a soldier on credit, providing such credit did not exceed one-fourth of the soldier's pay. They were not allowed, however, to place a lien on more than one-sixth of the soldier's pay.² In spite of these regulations, sutlery continued to be the most disgraceful feature of army life. Its evils existed both in the Union and Confederate Armies until the end of the Civil War. Sutlers used avari-

cious, illegal, and vicious tricks to get the lion's share of the soldier's pay. They acquired and held their concessions through political influence in their states. They bribed regimental councils to overlook regulations, alter prices, or remove restrictions.³ Because food was bad in the Union Army, sutler stores were regular refuges for the weary victims of "salt horse" and pickled pork.⁴ The fare of the Confederate soldier was equally as bad. It was no wonder that, after the Battle of Seven Pines, a sutler's tent filled with oranges, lemons, oysters, pineapples, sardines, and other luxuries seemed unbelievable to a Tennessean who had been living on hard tack for several days.⁵

It is remarkable that sutlers in the Union Army were tolerated in spite of their excessively high prices. In City Point, Virginia, for example, one can of fruit sold for \$1.00 to \$1.25, sweet potatoes for 15 cents a pound, cheese for 60 cents a pound, butter for 85 cents a pound, and condensed milk for \$1.00 a can. At this rate, the \$13.00 a month paid to the average Union soldier lasted only a few minutes.⁶ Sutlers in the Confederate Army were not always as fortunate. Confederate soldiers, whose pay averaged \$11.00 a month, infuriated when they had to pay \$5.00 for a quire of paper, \$3.00 for a bottle of ink, and \$3.00 for a package of envelopes, often drove the sutler off—minus his provisions.⁷

The United States Army abolished sutlery in 1867. Thereafter, the Subsistence Department was required to furnish articles designated by the inspectors general of the Army. These articles were sold at cost to officers and enlisted men. In 1870, the Secretary of War approved the establishment of post traders. These traders had many of the rights and privileges that had formerly belonged to sutlers. However, they could not sell any article supplied by the Army; they could not sell liquor; and they could not place a lien of any kind on a soldier's pay.⁸ Unfortunately, post traders brought back many of the objectionable practices of sutlery.

Post traders were outlawed on 1 February 1889. Then The Quartermaster General was given authority to purchase post-trader stores and turn them into post canteens.⁹ Post canteens became post exchanges in February 1892. The War Department announced 6 months later that they might be set up at camps or posts upon approval of The Quartermaster General

but that no money appropriated for the support of the Army would be spent for them.¹⁰ By 1899, 80 post and 34 regimental exchanges had been established.¹¹ These exchanges operated primarily to sell to troops at reasonable cost articles of convenience and necessity not supplied by the United States Government.¹² The Subsistence Department continued to sell through sales commissaries items supplied by the Government until it was combined with the Quartermaster and Paymaster Departments to form the Quartermaster Corps in August 1912.¹³

A central control agency for post exchanges did not exist until June 1941. Then the War Department created the Army Exchange Service and made it part of the Morale Branch.¹⁴ When the Army was reorganized on 9 March 1942, the Morale Branch became the Special Service Division, Services of Supply. When the Services of Supply became the Army Service Forces on 12 March 1943, the Army Exchange Service was divorced from the Special Service Division and made a special staff section under the Director of Administration.¹⁵

THE ARMY EXCHANGE SERVICE ORGANIZED

The Special Army Observers Group (SPOBS) had been in existence for 3 months when Major General James E. Chaney prepared his first comprehensive report on Great Britain's ability to receive and accommodate United States forces. None of the features of this report are as interesting, perhaps, as his recommendations for maintaining morale. Pointing out that American tobacco, candy, soft drinks, and razor blades were unobtainable in the United Kingdom, he urged that post exchange supplies be shipped with each convoy.¹⁶

On 10 February 1942 General George C. Marshall, complaining that the shipment of post exchange supplies to the United Kingdom was affecting the movement of other more essential items, told Major General Chaney that most post exchange supplies had been placed in priority V. Beer, soft drinks, radios, musical instruments, and motion picture equipment had been placed in priorities X and XI.¹⁷ When Major General Chaney learned of this, he asked for enough post exchange supplies to maintain 13,000 men for 60 days.¹⁸ He took measures at the same time to establish a central post exchange agency.

The Special Service Division, USAFBI, was created on 13 March 1942 under the direction of Lieutenant Colonel Edmund M. Barnum.¹⁹ Because the Army Exchange Service was part

of this division, Lieutenant Colonel Barnum served also as Army Exchange Service Officer. He issued at once regulations establishing prices for post exchange supplies and weekly ration allowances. The prices were approximately the same as those charged in post exchanges in the United States. The following ration was established for each soldier:

- 3 candy bars per week
- 3 packages of cigarettes per week
- 1 package of gum per week
- 1 cake of soap per month
- 12 boxes of matches per month²⁰

The European Theater was established on 8 June 1942. At this time Colonel Barnum was relieved as special service officer and appointed Chief, Army Exchange Service.²¹

The Army Exchange Service, an adjunct of the Army, was entirely financed by loans from the Defense Supplies Corporation, a subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.²² It supervised the operation of post exchanges. It made available from its earnings funds that could be used to give military personnel additional means of comfort, recreation, and amusement. Post exchanges were opened with nonappropriated funds. They operated without profit to supply officers, enlisted men, and other authorized persons with articles of necessity and convenience not provided by the United States Government.

When the Army Exchange Service was established in the United Kingdom, it was responsible for the procurement, storage, distribution, issue, and sale of its own supplies. Because tonnage was extremely limited during the summer and fall of 1942, post exchanges could supply only limited quantities of tobacco products, toilet articles, and candies. Though some consideration was given to the possibility of supplying beer, soft drinks, magazines, and gift items, many months passed before any definite action was taken.²³

Troops who arrived in the United Kingdom early in 1942 had a vivid recollection of post exchanges in the United States, which they had been accustomed to regard as clubs or recreation halls. Every camp in the United States had at least one post exchange in each area where troops were billeted or employed. These exchanges sold everything from doughnuts and ice cream to shoe laces and newspapers. Post exchanges in the United Kingdom were entirely different. A unit was lucky if its exchange was in a separate building. It was luckier if its exchange was open more than 4 or 5 hours a day. Usually, post exchanges were operated by a few men who were willing to sacrifice part of their leisure time. They were in reality unit ex-

changes serving the men in one company or regiment. When new units arrived, the Army Exchange Service arranged to sell their supplies on credit; and they had to agree to resell items for cash and settle their accounts with the Army Exchange Service within 14 days. Because stocks were extremely limited, purchasers were restricted to weekly rations.²⁴

Until post exchanges could be established in areas taken over from the British, United States troops were served by the Navy, Army, Air Force Institute, (NAAFI), the British counterpart of the Army Exchange Service. NAAFI bought United States products at a 25 percent discount and resold them at the list price. Every 6 months it deducted direct and indirect operating expenses from the gross profits of each canteen operated for the United States forces. A net gain was turned over to the Army Exchange Service. If NAAFI had more expenses than profits, the Army Exchange Service made up the difference.²⁵

THE ARMY EXCHANGE SERVICE INACTIVATED

In June 1942, Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill and Sir Alan F. Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, met with President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his chiefs of staff in Washington. When, during their discussions, the Allied situation in North Africa took a turn for the worse, they decided to launch operation TORCH.²⁶ Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Commander for the operation, and on 11 August 1942 Allied Force Headquarters was established at London.²⁷ At once, the build-up of men and supplies in Great Britain for a Continental invasion became secondary to the support of the Center Task Force, which was launched from the United Kingdom. The limited shipping space was used almost exclusively for TORCH supplies. Units in the United Kingdom were stripped to form the Center Task Force and its supporting elements. The European Theater was led to understand that it would have to get along with what it had until full-scale BOLERO planning could be resumed.

Major General John C. H. Lee dissolved the Army Exchange Service on 24 August 1942 and transferred its functions to the Quartermaster Service.²⁸ There were several reasons for his action. First, Army Exchange Service personnel had not been made available. Second, the Army Exchange Service was not a going concern. Its merchandise was insured at more than 15 percent of cost. It had to pay 2 percent interest on its loans from the Defense Supplies Corporation. Third, the European Theater had

not received the War Department directive of 15 July 1942 allowing the Army Exchange Service to purchase supplies from the Quartermaster Corps and mark up prices 10 percent to defray operating expenses. Fourth, the War Department had made the Quartermaster Corps responsible on 12 August 1942 for the procurement, shipment, storage, and distribution of Army Exchange Service supplies.²⁹

Colonel Barnum moved his staff from London to Cheltenham during the last week of August 1942 and became Chief of the Exchange Service Division, OCQM, almost a month before the War Department gave General Eisenhower permission to discontinue post exchanges and establish quartermaster sales stores. These stores would stock and sell without profit the 134 articles listed in the OQMG circular of 12 August 1942. The United States Government would assume all costs for transporting and distributing these supplies. General Eisenhower would appoint a board of officers to supervise a physical inventory of all Army Exchange Service supplies, to determine the fair value of those supplies, and to sell them to the Quartermaster Service.³⁰ The board was created on 10 October and told to complete the inventory within 11 days.³¹ The Army Exchange Service was officially discontinued in the European Theater on 25 October 1942 when the inventory was completed.³² The Post Exchange Board completed its proceedings on 19 December 1942 and recommended that the Army Exchange Service be paid \$4,623,868.32 for its merchandise on or before 25 January 1943.³³ The Theater Commander approved the report on 4 February 1943.³⁴

TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENTS

When the Quartermaster Service took over the duties of the Army Exchange Service in August 1942, there was only one post exchange in the European Theater. That was at Services of Supply headquarters in Cheltenham. All units in England were being supplied from this installation or from Army Exchange Service depots in London, Liverpool, and Bristol. Units provided their own transportation for the 14-day supply of merchandise that was issued to them on credit. In areas where troops were heavily concentrated the Army Exchange Service had planned to open a number of subdepots that were to hold a balanced stock of post exchange merchandise. It had also planned to operate mobile post exchanges for smaller units in the field and for troops arriving at ports.³⁵

At first the Chief Quartermaster went along with this basic plan. As personnel and facilities should become available, the Commanding Gen-

eral, SOS, ETOUSA, would establish sales stores to provide post exchange items to troops in the Theater. Mobile sales units would be operated at ports for the benefit of newly arrived organizations and for organizations in isolated areas. Commanding officers of posts, camps, or stations not near sales stores would appoint sales officers to provide sales store service for their commands. These officers would obtain from the base section quartermaster the names of the depots from which they would requisition supplies. They would furnish transportation to move supplies from depots. They would account for all supplies received and within 14 days would deposit funds for payment in the nearest finance office.

The Commanding General, SOS, ETOUSA, would prescribe rations and allowances for United States forces in order to assure an equitable distribution of available sales store supplies, to conform to the rationing policies of the British Government, and to curb black-market activities. Model stocks for 1,000 men for 30 days appear as appendix IX. Each officer and enlisted man was entitled to a weekly ration of 3 razor blades, 2 candy bars, 1 candy roll, 1 package of chewing gum, $\frac{1}{2}$ pound of cookies, 2 boxes of matches, 7 packages of cigarettes, and 4 cans of beer if available. Instead of the cigarettes, they could receive 28 cigars or 1 can of pipe tobacco. Commanders of posts, camps, and stations could ask the Commanding General, SOS, ETOUSA, for permission to use NAAFI canteens if sales stores could not be established in or near their areas.³⁶

More specific procedures were established about a month later. Then, a distinction was made between sales stores that sold only post exchange items and special stores that sold officers' clothing as well. The depots in London, Ashchurch, Liverpool, and Bristol were designated bulk depots. They would hold all post exchange supplies shipped from the United States and procured in the United Kingdom. The bulk depots would issue supplies to distribution depots, which handled subsistence. Sales stores were no longer to be operated by units. They were to be established for posts, depots, or headquarters of base sections. In other words, they were to become retail stores similar to post exchanges in the United States. Sales officers would continue to function as they had previously, but they would be responsible for only one store rather than for a number of small unit exchanges. Each soldier would receive a ration card entitling him to his weekly ration, which had been increased by one package of hard candy, one can of peanuts, and one bar of soap.

Post exchange supplies would be made available to United States forces on troop transports. Crews and personnel of United States ships other than troop transports would receive cigarettes, cigars, and tobacco, toilet articles, candy, gum, cookies, stationery, and pencils in quantities decided upon by the commander of the port at which the ship was docked.³⁷

THE ARMY EXCHANGE SERVICE REORGANIZED

The new year apparently brought a complete change of mind to the War Department and a great deal of confusion to the European Theater. The Commanding General, SOS, ETOUSA, informed the Commanding General, ETOUSA, on 25 January 1943 that he had received authorization from the War Department to reestablish the Army Exchange Service³⁸ and suggested that approximately 25 percent of the accumulated earnings of the old Army Exchange Service, or \$700,000, be used as the initial working capital for the new service.³⁹ Lieutenant General Frank M. Andrews, who had replaced Lieutenant General Eisenhower as Theater Commander, at first refused to accept the recommendation⁴⁰ but changed his mind a day later.⁴¹

When the War Department officially directed on 13 February 1943 that the Army Exchange Service in Europe be reestablished as a special staff section under the Commanding General, Services of Supply,⁴² the Chief Quartermaster recommended that Colonel Barnum be reappointed Chief of the Army Exchange Service effective 15 March 1943.⁴³ Though Lieutenant General Andrews approved the request on 14 March,⁴⁴ The Adjutant General withheld publication, claiming that the entire matter should be restudied in the light of new information from the War Department.⁴⁵

The new information was probably the War Department's decision regarding a requisition the Chief Quartermaster had submitted to the New York port in December 1942.⁴⁶ Because the requisition for wrist watches, pocket watches, and alarm clocks did not reach the United States until January 1943, it caused a considerable amount of confusion. The requested items were not listed in Circular No. 450, published on 30 December, which specified the sales store and post exchange items that the Quartermaster Corps was allowed to provide. The Commanding General of the New York port asked OQMG to clear up the matter, explaining that his office had not been able to obtain specific information about the procurement and shipment of Army Exchange Service supplies.⁴⁷ He was told that the Quartermaster Corps would procure

and ship only the items listed in Circular No. 450. All other items would be procured and shipped by the Army Exchange Service.⁴⁹ The Commanding General, Services of Supply, War Department, corroborated this decision several days later.⁴⁹

When the Chief Quartermaster learned of this, he asked The Quartermaster General for more definite information. Even after the publication of Circular No. 450, which did definitely say that the Army Exchange Service would procure and ship articles not listed in the directive, he had assumed that the Quartermaster Corps was the wholesaler and the Army Exchange Service the retailer of Army Exchange Service supplies. Furthermore, because the Army Exchange Service had not yet been reorganized in Europe, the Quartermaster Service was doing the whole job.⁵⁰

The directive reestablishing the Army Exchange Service in Europe was published on 24 April 1943 and became effective 1 May 1943. Colonel Barnum, Chief of the Army Exchange Service, was charged with the supervision of all exchanges in the United Kingdom. He would exercise his responsibility through the Central Exchange, London. Quartermaster sales stores that sold post exchange items were designated post exchanges; special quartermaster sales stores that sold officers' clothing were designated quartermaster sales stores. The Chief Quartermaster could continue to establish and operate quartermaster sales stores and mobile sales units, which would sell clothing and accessories to commissioned personnel only.

The Quartermaster Service would procure, store, and issue all post exchange items. Using their own transportation, post exchanges would draw supplies from depots designated by base section quartermasters. New exchanges were allowed to draw a 28-day supply. All others were limited to a 14-day supply. The tally-out given by the depot to the exchange would become an invoice, to which the Central Exchange would add a 2½ percent operating charge. The exchange could settle its account either with the Army Exchange Fiscal Officer of the base section or with the Central Exchange. The Quartermaster Service would establish cost prices for all post exchange items and send a bill to the Central Exchange for all supplies delivered to post exchanges. Post exchanges would resell United States items at cost plus 10 percent and British items at prices established by British authorities.

Post exchanges would sell to the commissioned and enlisted personnel of the United States armed forces, commissioned and enlisted personnel of Allied armed forces on duty with

United States organizations, American Red Cross workers, United States war correspondents, and Federal employees working for American embassies or the United States armed forces.

Post exchanges could not be operated at a profit. Cash from sales would be used to pay for merchandise, to meet the salaries of enlisted or civilian employees, to defray operating expenses, and to give exchanges title to supplies. An enlisted man working in a post exchange would receive a supplementary salary equal to half of his base pay.⁵¹

Apparently, these procedures did not meet with War Department approval, for the Chief Quartermaster ran into difficulty early in May 1943. The New York port again notified him that he was not to procure all post exchange supplies but merely those listed in OQMG Circular Letter No. 450. No other items for post exchanges would be procured or shipped until the Army Exchange Service in Europe was financially able to take care of its own requirements.⁵² Brigadier General Littlejohn opposed this plan strenuously. He defended the policy in the European Theater that made one agency, the Quartermaster Service, responsible for the procurement, storage, and distribution of post exchange supplies. The wholesale-retail relationship between the Quartermaster and Army Exchange Services should be continued.⁵³ The argument came to an end in August 1943 when Major General Frank F. Scowden of the Office of The Quartermaster General sent the Chief Quartermaster a copy of a War Department circular establishing a supply program for army exchanges.⁵⁴

The Exchange Supply Program

Using OQMG Circular Letter No. 450 as a basis, the Chief of the Army Exchange Service in Washington would prepare from time to time a list of essential items for oversea exchanges. These items would not be procured by the Army Exchange Service but by the Quartermaster Corps, which would also ship, store, and distribute them. Unit or post exchanges overseas would requisition them from quartermaster depots and reimburse the Quartermaster Service through the Theater Finance Officer. The Army Exchange Service would procure, ship, store, and distribute post exchange supplies not included in the list. Army exchange officers would attempt to procure locally as many articles as possible.⁵⁵

Major General Scowden, commenting on this circular in a letter to the Chief Quartermaster, stated that any further argument would be useless. "While this arrangement is objected to

by you," he said, "I do not believe that we would be successful in having it changed. While conditions in ETO may, from your point of view, justify the total procurement of all Army Exchange supplies by the Quartermaster Corps . . . , we are confronted with the requirements of all theaters of operations, and a general policy seems necessary."⁵⁶

On 7 October 1943 the War Department rescinded OQMG Circular Letter No. 450 and listed the types of articles that the Army Exchange Service would handle for itself. Included were band aids, books, boxes of candy, drugs, games, insecticides, first-aid kits, magazines, low-quarter shoes, bathing trunks, and watches. Items procured especially for officers would be sold only by quartermaster sales stores. Items procured especially for enlisted men would be sold only by post exchanges. Cosmetics, toilet articles, and other notions procured especially for women would also be sold only in post exchanges. Articles of convenience and necessity not supplied by the United States Government would be sold to officers and enlisted men through post exchanges only.⁵⁷

JOINT OPERATIONS

At first, the reactivation of the Army Exchange Service did little else but completely fog an already cloudy issue in the European Theater. For many months neither the Chief Quartermaster nor the Chief of the Army Exchange Service was certain of his responsibilities. For almost half a year the OCQM was in Cheltenham and the Army Exchange Service in London. Because these two headquarters were almost 100 miles apart, close cooperation, coordination, and control were all but impossible. Though the Army Exchange Service kept two liaison officers at OCQM, staff officers of the Army Exchange Service rarely had an accurate picture of stocks on hand or stocks due in. Not until February 1944 were the two offices able to devise an efficient operating plan, and that was effective only until August 1944.⁵⁸

The Detailed Plan

On 4 February 1944 the Chief Quartermaster and the Chief of the Army Exchange Service signed a detailed plan for the operation of army exchanges in the European Theater. The Quartermaster Service would act as the wholesaler for Army Exchange supplies. The Army Exchange Service would act as the retailer. The Army Exchange Service would assign liaison officers to OCQM. The Chief Quartermaster would keep these officers fully informed. The Chief Quartermaster would procure 90 articles

from the United States and 45 in the United Kingdom. The Army Exchange Service would procure 17 articles from the United States and none in the United Kingdom. OCQM would buy, store, and distribute all the items the Army Exchange Service procured from the United States except ice-cream mix, powdered milk, chocolate sirup, office equipment, furniture and fixtures, and machinery. The items would be issued to post exchanges for resale to troops. Major General Littlejohn had not been shaken from his belief that OCQM should control all post exchange supplies and thereby eliminate the need for army exchange depots. Consequently, this part of the plan, which was contrary to War Department regulations, was in the nature of a compromise. It was approved by the Theater Commander, however, because it met the special conditions in the European Theater. A list of articles to be procured by both services appears in appendix X, a copy of the detailed plan.

In order to make storage and distribution easier, post exchange supplies were broken down into three main categories. Category I supplies were those normally procured and distributed by the Quartermaster Corps. They would be stored in depots without reference to the Army Exchange Service. Category II supplies were those procured by the Army Exchange Service and purchased by OCQM for resale to unit exchanges. These supplies would be held intact at depots until representatives of the Army Exchange Service tallied them in. The purchasing and contracting officer of the depot would initiate payment to the Army Exchange Service. Category III supplies were special items such as fixtures and furniture for post exchanges. These would be held at depots until the Army Exchange Service should issue shipping instructions.

All post exchange supplies would be stored in 6 bulk depots and 28 distribution depots. No levels of supply would be established for bulk depots. All distribution depots, except the one in Northern Ireland, would hold a 30-day level. The Northern Ireland depot would hold a 60-day level for 150,000 men. Post exchanges could have a 30-day supply on hand. Units scheduled to be alerted for the Continental invasion would reduce their stocks to a 14-day level, and alerted units to a 7-day level.

The Quartermaster Service would prepare requisitions for supplies from the United States, using the allowances published by the War Department. It would prepare demands for supplies from the United Kingdom, using factors established by the Army Exchange Service or allowances agreed upon by United States



Figure 23.—A Post Exchange Warehouse on the Continent.




Figure 24.—A Typical Communications Zone Exchange.



Figure 25.—A Post Exchange in the Assembly Area after VE-day.



Figure 26.—Troops Purchasing Magazines in a Continental Post Exchange.

Army and British authorities. The Army Exchange Service would review factors and recommend changes. Depots would issue supplies against requisitions presented by unit exchanges. These requisitions would be within the allowances published by the Army Exchange Service. The Quartermaster Service would make sure that depots issued supplies according to allowances. The Army Exchange Service would see that post exchanges did not over-requisition.

The Chief Quartermaster would determine the cost prices of post exchange items and give a cost-price list to the Chief of the Army Exchange Service. The Chief of the Army Exchange Service would determine the selling price list to post exchanges. Depots issuing supplies to post exchanges would send tally-outs to the Central Exchange, London, which would send the depot a check on or before the 20th of each month. The depot would record payment and forward the check to the local finance officer, who would send it on to the Fiscal Director, ETOUSA, for forwarding to the Treasurer of the United States. Post exchanges would not be financially obligated to the issuing depot. They would send to the Central Exchange all money realized from sales. The Chief Quartermaster would be held accountable for all Army Exchange Service supplies procured and shipped by the Quartermaster Corps. The Chief of the Army Exchange Service would be held accountable for all supplies delivered to post exchanges.⁵⁹

BEFORE THE CROSS-CHANNEL TRIP

OVERLORD was mounted from the area of southern England adjacent to the Channel ports. Here were established areas where troops were clothed, equipped, and otherwise made ready for invasion. These areas were divided into three subareas, each with a specific purpose. The concentration area, where units were assembled before the start of their journey to embarkation points, was farthest from the port. Here troops turned in the equipment that they would not need during the assault. The marshaling area, where units were broken down into boat parties for embarkation, was closer to the ports. Here troops were completely equipped for their mission. The embarkation area was at the port. Here the men were loaded aboard transports. Usually, troops were processed in 4 or 5 days. Some units, however, remained for several weeks.

When the time for combat was approaching, post exchange supplies were of the utmost importance to the morale of the troops. The Army

Exchange Service and the Quartermaster Service, therefore, combined their efforts, talents, and facilities to keep concentration, marshaling, and embarkation areas well supplied with candy, chewing gum, cigars, cigarettes, tobacco, and other post exchange items.

Units alerted for movement to the Continent continued to operate post exchanges at their home stations until they were alerted. Then they operated exchanges in the concentration areas until they moved into marshaling or embarkation areas, where exchanges were operated only for static troops. Transient troops received from the Quartermaster Service a daily gratuitous issue of ration accessory convenience (RAC) kits. These kits contained a daily allowance of razor blades, shaving cream, tooth powder, toilet soap, cigarettes, tobacco, matches, hard candy, and gum. If units remained in the marshaling areas for more than 4 days, they received every other day a bar of chocolate instead of hard candy. Just before embarkation each soldier received a week's free ration consisting of 1 razor blade, 1 carton of cigarettes, 1 can of pipe tobacco, 7 sticks of gum, and 14 books of safety matches.⁶⁰

INVASION PLANS

On 23 December 1941 the United States was preparing for its first wartime Christmas. Along Broadway, the entertainment center of the world, people were milling in front of the theater showing *H. M. Pulham, Esq.* Along Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, the political center of the world, people were milling in front of the White House for a glimpse of Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill. He had come, with his Chiefs of Staff, for a series of conferences with President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Out of their talks grew the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the strategical command for the British and American forces.⁶¹ In less than 2 weeks after its creation, this body agreed to the dispatch of United States forces to the British Isles. The build-up of men and supplies for the Continental liberation had begun.

Ration Accessory Convenience Kits

In July 1942 theater commanders were authorized to issue as part of the field ration, when sales stores or post exchanges were not available, the following 12 post exchange items: razor blades, razors, shaving cream, tooth brushes, tooth powder, toilet soap, hard candy, cigarettes, cigarette papers, cigarette tobacco, pipe tobacco, matches, and chewing gum.⁶² When the Office of The Quartermaster General republished this directive on 22 March 1943, it

announced that for the sake of easier distribution the items would be packed as RAC kits. The three types of kits would contain the following items and quantities:

Toilet Kit (800 rations)

Item	Unit	Daily allowance	Quantity per kit
Blades, safety-razor	ea.	.15	120
Brush, tooth	ea.	.015	12
Cream, shaving	oz.	.08	64
Powder, tooth	oz.	.035	28
Razor, safety	ea.	.005	4
Soap, toilet	oz.	.14	112

Tobacco Kit (200 rations)

Cigarettes	ea.	20.	4,000
Matches, safety	ea.	40.	8,000
Tobacco, chewing	oz.	.01	2
Tobacco, pipe	oz.	.08	16

Candy Kit (400 rations)

Candy, hard	oz.	1.	400
Gum, chewing	stick	1.	400 ⁶³

Suggested Changes

When on 6 June 1943, 1 year before D-day, the European Theater was asked to estimate its requirements for RAC kits for the next 6 months,⁶⁴ the Chief Quartermaster replied that he would need 30,000 tobacco kits, 15,000 candy kits, and 7,500 toilet kits.⁶⁵ About a month later, the Chief of the Supply Division reported that he was not entirely satisfied with RAC kits. First, the kits were packed separately. This was certain to cause confusion on the Continent. The toilet kits would be in one place and the candy and tobacco kits in another. Second, the kits had different weights. The toilet kit weighed 39 pounds, the candy kit 40 pounds, and the cigarette kit 32 pounds. Third, there was not enough selection. He believed that about 30 of the most popular sales store and post exchange items should be packed in a single kit weighing about 62 pounds. This combat sales kit would hold 175 rations for 1 day or 25 rations for 7 days. It would be issued free of charge to troops aboard transports destined for the Continent and to troops on the Continent during the first 60 days of the invasion. It would eliminate the need for sales stores during the early stages of the campaign, reduce the amount of money to be handled by sales officers on the Continent, and guarantee that all items were distributed equally. After D-plus-60-day, the kits could be sold to troops in the communications zone without too much

difficulty. There would be no pricing problem, for the contents of the kits would be published before embarkation and units would know how much to collect from troops. There would be no storage problem. If the kits were amphibiously packed, they could be stored in the open at class I depots. Most of them, however, could be distributed at once. The only drawback was that they could not be packed in the European Theater but would have to be made up in the United States.⁶⁶ The Chief of the Plans and Training Division did not agree with the plan, though his office had had no experience with the suggested kit or with anything remotely similar to it. The kits contained many items for which combat troops would have no need. It would be better, he thought, to have on hand large quantities of cigarettes and candy and to eliminate many of the items that the kits would contain in small quantities.⁶⁷

The Chief Quartermaster evidently found some merit in the suggestion, for he asked The Quartermaster General to consolidate the three RAC kits into one kit.⁶⁸ The Quartermaster General replied that the year's supply of RAC kits would have to be exhausted before any new kits could be shipped.⁶⁹ Changing his mind in April 1944, he announced that the composite RAC kit would contain the following items:

Composite Kit (200 rations)

Item	Unit	Daily allowance	Quantity per kit
Blade, safety-razor	ea.	.150	30
Brush, tooth	ea.	.015	2
Candy, bar or roll	oz.	1.000	200
Cigarette	ea.	20.000	4,000
Cream, shaving	oz.	.080	28
Gum, chewing	stick	1.000	200
Matches, safety	pkg.	1.000	8,000
Powder, tooth	oz.	.035	11
Razor, safety	ea.	.005	1
Soap, toilet	oz.	.140	28
Tobacco, chewing	oz.	.010	2
Tobacco, smoking	oz.	.080	16 ⁷⁰

Shipping Schedules

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, Supreme Allied Command, set in July 1943 the keynote for post exchange planning. Because sales stores and post exchanges handled semiluxuries, they would not be operated until transportation for other-than-essential items should become available. The establishment of United States sales stores and post exchanges would be coincidental with that of British canteens. In the meantime, United States troops would receive exchange supplies on a free and automatic basis.⁷¹ Con-

sequently, OCQM reported that a timetable had been established for the issue of RAC kits to some troops and the sale of post exchange supplies to others. Tobacco kits would begin to be issued about D-plus-5-day, candy kits about D-plus-8-day, and toilet kits about D-plus-10-day. Bulk shipments of post exchange supplies for sale to troops would not begin until about D-plus-30-day.⁷² On 1 March 1944, OCQM published the class II and class IV supply plan for an operation on the Continent. This plan set forth the following schedule for the sale and issue of post exchange supplies:

Period	Issue (Percent of troops)	Sale (Percent of troops)
D-day to D+5	0	0
D+6 to D+30	100	0
D+31 to D+60	90	10
D+61 to D+76	70	30
D+77 to D+90	50	50 ⁷³

General Eisenhower believed that the indomitable fighting spirit of the Allied forces would contribute more than weapons and equip-

ment to the defeat of Germany.⁷⁴ Therefore, he was determined that combat forces would be given preferential treatment. If the distribution system could not provide combat troops with adequate allowances, then the rear echelons and base sections also would accept inadequacies.⁷⁵ Lieutenant General Lee assured General Eisenhower that the supply services had always planned to operate on such a principle. "It must be implemented," he said, "with care and discretion—to achieve its high morale value without embarrassing or hindering effective supply operations."⁷⁶ Major General Littlejohn was in complete agreement with the policy. He explained that every quartermaster plan, and the post exchange plan in particular, had been based upon the assumption that field forces would always receive priority. The Quartermaster Service would continue as long as necessary the gratuitous issue of RAC kits in advance of railheads. In every case, combat requirements would be met first, hospital requirements second, rear-echelon ground-force requirements third, and communications zone requirements last.⁷⁷

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Figure 27.—Coca-Cola in Storage on the Continent.




Figure 28.—American Beer Garden in the Ile de Saint Germain, Paris.

CHAPTER 4

POST EXCHANGES ON THE CONTINENT

The early days of the Continental invasion bear witness to Robert Browning's keen observation that human plans and projects come to naught. Though post exchanges should have opened early in July, they did not begin to operate until late August. Though ration accessory kits should have been issued only to combat troops after the assault, they were issued to all troops until the armies liberated Paris. Bulk distribution, which should have been minor and inconsequential, became a hopeless muddle. Requests for space allocations and high priorities had to pass through a labyrinth of official channels. By the time the requests were granted, if they were, conditions had so changed that they were inadequate and ineffective.

Pilferage was a continuing problem. Post exchange supplies were perhaps the most sought-after items on the Continent. Troops were going to get them one way or another. Candy bars and American tobacco often spoke louder than money in the black market. Boxes of chewing gum were known to bring bottles of Chanel No. 5 for milady's dressing table. Jewelry could be had for a box of chocolate bars or a few cartons of cigarettes.

Procedure that had been worked out between the Chief Quartermaster and the Chief of the Army Exchange Service in February 1944 was not applicable after D-day. Then new procedure had to be developed for operations on the Continent. Though drafted in mid-June 1944, it was never approved.¹ Most of the problems that arose in connection with joint control of post exchange supplies were, therefore, settled by oral agreement rather than by official action.

THE STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

On 15 June 1944 the European Theater published the standing operating procedure for the activation and operation of post exchanges. The Army Exchange Service would purchase from the Chief Quartermaster all articles listed in WD Circular No. 245 of 7 October 1943 except clothing. Post exchanges in the European Theater would not sell clothing to anyone. The Army Exchange Service would be the sole retailer of post exchange supplies. The Chief Quartermaster, however, would make gratuitous issues when Army Exchange Service facilities were not available.

The Chief of the Army Exchange Service was authorized to operate the following types of establishments:

Barber shops	Radio-repair shops
Beauty shops	Restaurants
Beer bars	Soda fountains
Branch exchanges	Tailor shops
Central exchanges	Warehouses
Laundries	Watch-repair shops

It could grant concessions to civilian firms for many of these services, but could make contracts only on a yearly basis. The Quartermaster Service would provide all furniture and fixtures for Army Exchange Service installations.

As soon as exchanges should be opened in newly occupied territory, the exchange officer would requisition a 7-day supply of popular and essential items. Exchanges opened in established areas would requisition supplies on a 30-day basis and would provide their own transportation. A table of allowances showing the maximum quantities of items that could be drawn for 1,000 men for 30 days appears as appendix XI.

The Theater Exchange Officer would determine ration allowances and prices. He would distribute ration cards that would limit each purchaser to the weekly ration shown in appendix XII. Post exchanges would sell to military personnel of the United States Armed Forces; members of Allied forces on duty with United States organizations; members of the American Red Cross; members of USO Camp shows; accredited United States war correspondents; Federal employees working for American embassies or the United States Armed Forces; members of the United States Merchant Marine; British nationals employed by the United States Armed Forces; and nationals of other Allied nations, if employed by the United States forces in countries other than their own. Prisoners of war would be sold the limited ration shown in appendix XIII.²

Confused Responsibilities

On 22 June 1944, 7 days after the standing operating procedure was published, the Forward Echelon, Communications Zone, (FECZ), issued a plan for the joint control of post exchange supplies by the Quartermaster and the Army Exchange Services. Neither Colonel

Robert J. Marshburn, who had been made Theater Exchange Officer in May 1944, nor Major General Littlejohn approved the plan. Both officers believed that the Army Exchange Service should be a self-sufficient organization. It should be able to establish and operate its own distributing points. It should have a staff capable of computing tonnage requirements and bidding for space allocations. Consequently, the Chief Quartermaster directed the Chief of the Supply Division to prepare a plan that would allow the Quartermaster Service to help rather than operate the Army Exchange Service.³ The plan, which was drafted several days later, provided that the Army Exchange Service would open in the communications zone a series of large, centrally located post exchanges, rather than several hundred small unit exchanges, and that to this end personnel and facilities would be made available.

The Quartermaster Service would store post exchange supplies in bulk at main class II and class IV depots. It would issue in bulk to the First and Third Armies, the Air Force, Army Exchange Service installations in the communications zone, the American Red Cross, the United States Navy, and the War Shipping Administration. The Army Exchange Service would establish and operate 12 distributing points and 12 central post exchanges near class I supply dumps. Each distributing point would be sold an initial 18-day stock of supplies. Thereafter, supplies would be replenished by requisitions. The Army Exchange Service would provide transportation to move supplies from depots to distributing points and from distributing points to post exchanges. The Army Exchange Service distributing points would settle their accounts weekly with the quartermaster depot.

The operating personnel of the Army Exchange Service consisted of 6 officers and 150 enlisted men. The Chief Quartermaster would add three depot supply companies or an equal number of troops. With this manpower the Chief of the Army Exchange Service would be able to operate the centrally located post exchanges, the distributing points, and the trucks needed to carry the exchange supplies from depots to distributing points and post exchanges.⁴

Though Colonel Marshburn approved the plan on 12 August 1944,⁵ the many different interpretations during the next few weeks caused the Chief Quartermaster to report on 7 September that a definite misunderstanding existed. He was most disturbed by an oft-repeated statement that he had promised to give the Army Exchange Service three depot supply

companies "forever and eternally." He reminded Colonel Marshburn of a series of discussions that had been held with the Chief of Staff of the Communications Zone and with G-4 and G-1. During these talks the Chief Quartermaster had suggested and the other representatives had agreed that the personnel for the Army Exchange Service be prorated from the various services of supply. Until this could be completed the Chief Quartermaster would lend the Army Exchange Service three depot supply companies. These would be returned when the Chief Quartermaster should be told of his personnel obligation to the Army Exchange Service.

Major General Littlejohn was also concerned about the question of tonnage. The Quartermaster Service would continue to requisition and procure, he said, all post exchange supplies listed in War Department directives. The Army Exchange Service, however, would have to determine its own requirements and procure its own special items. It would have to bid for space aboard ships bringing supplies to the Continent from the United States and the United Kingdom. He said also that the Army Exchange Service should not plan to operate in the communications zone snack bars and other such small-time enterprises. It should plan to operate in large cities post exchanges doing a \$50,000,000 a year business. These stores should sell perfume, lingerie, gifts, and souvenirs of all kinds.⁶

EARLY DIFFICULTIES

The First Army Quartermaster had reported during the battle at Saint Lo that RAC kits were plentiful but inadequate. Troops were clamoring for a wider selection. He did not have enough other post exchange supplies to make a general distribution to all troops. There was at most a 5-day supply for 45 percent of the troop strength. If rear-echelon troops could get chewing tobacco and aspirin, front-line soldiers should have the same privilege. Therefore, he could not begin to sell these items to troops behind railheads.⁷ The Chief of the Supply Division, the First Army Quartermaster, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 for the First Army, and the ADSEC Quartermaster, agreed that the only solution was to continue the gratuitous issue of RAC kits until post exchanges could be established.⁸

Though Major General Littlejohn was forced to accept the solution, he was not pleased with it. Ration accessory kits were being used not only on the Continent but in marshaling areas and hospitals as well. If they continued to be issued much longer to everyone and anyone, he said, stocks would be depleted. He was deter-

mined that every hospitalized soldier and every soldier in combat would get cigars, cigarettes, and candy regardless of who paid for them or how they were distributed. He believed that the Army Exchange Service and the American Red Cross should take care of the men in hospitals and leave him free to worry about men in the front lines.⁹

Lieutenant Colonel Edwin J. Fitzpatrick of the Subsistence Division said that there were three good reasons why OCQM should not keep on struggling with RAC kits. First, it would be much simpler to hand out post exchange supplies in bulk at large depots. Second, any attempt to dovetail the issue of RAC kits with later bulk issue was doomed to immediate failure. Third, the problem of RAC kits would plague OCQM as long as the Subsistence Division was responsible for their supply, which was really a Supply Division function.¹⁰ The last criticism apparently hit home, for the Supply Division became responsible for the supply of RAC kits on 7 August 1944.¹¹

The transfer was explained several weeks later. First, bulk components would have to be requested because ration accessory kits were in short supply in the United States. Second, the shipment and distribution of ration accessory kits had to be expedited. The new plan of operation instituted a number of changes. The armies would requisition rations and RAC kits at the same time. The Subsistence Division would compute requirements and send requisitions for RAC kits to the United States. If RAC kits were available, they would be shipped as class I tonnage and receive a higher priority than regular post exchange supplies. If RAC kits were not available, the Supply Division would ask the New York port to substitute bulk components and ship them as regular post exchange supplies. On the Continent the Subsistence Division would control the storage of RAC kits, which would be distributed with rations. The Supply Division would control the storage and distribution of bulk components and make them available to the Subsistence Division at class II sections of quartermaster depots.¹²

FOR THE COMMUNICATIONS ZONE

Though in the War Department the Services of Supply became the Army Services Forces, no such change in designation was made in the European Theater. Instead, on 6 June 1944 the Services of Supply, ETOUSA, became the Communications Zone. To carry out its primary mission of furnishing direct logistical support to the United States armies, the Communications Zone was divided into seven sections or base sections.¹³

ADSEC was the first section to arrive in France. Its units landed between 9 June and 17 July and operated immediately behind the First United States Army. On 14 July, when the army rear boundary was established, the ADSEC area became the communications zone. When Cherbourg fell on 27 June 1944, it was placed under the commanding officer of the 4th Major Port.¹⁴ Quartermaster representatives of ADSEC entered the city almost as soon as it fell and within a few days had established a depot in the Cherbourg Arsenal. An outside storage area was later opened at Couville.¹⁵ On 12 July 1944 the Cherbourg area was designated Area No. 1. Representatives from the special staff sections of ADSEC acted also as the area commander's special staff, responsible for the rehabilitation of the port area and for the supervision of all Special Service and Army Exchange Service activities. The Commanding General, ADSEC, controlled everything else. On 21 July this dual command was abolished and the Cherbourg Command established. The nucleus of this command was the personnel of the Headquarters, Southern Base Section. The Cherbourg Command became Base Section No. 3 on 7 August and the Normandy Base Section on 16 August.¹⁶

Several other base sections were created in rapid succession. The Brittany Base Section, with headquarters at Rennes, was established on 16 August; the Loire Base Section, with headquarters at Le Mans, on 22 August; the Channel Base Section, with headquarters at Fontainebleau, on 24 August; and the Seine Base Section with headquarters at Paris, on 26 August, the day after the city fell.¹⁷ Thus, the communications zone covered the entire area of northern France from the Seine River to the Atlantic Ocean. Of the approximately 1,205,000 United States soldiers on the Continent, approximately 320,000 were assigned to logistical forces.¹⁸ This was the situation on Sunday, 27 August 1944, when Major General Littlejohn directed that the issue of RAC kits be restricted to soldiers in combat units.¹⁹

Though no record exists as to exactly when the first post exchange was established, available information shows a rapid expansion of Army Exchange Service facilities during the latter part of August. The Chief of the Depot Branch, Storage and Distribution Division, OCQM, arrived in France on 20 August and prescribed a warehousing system for the Cherbourg depot. The arsenal, depot Q-1A, was to set aside 19,698 square feet for post exchange supplies. Depot Q-1B, at Couville, was to set

aside 7,560 square feet. By 15 September, depot Q-1A was serving 139 unit exchanges in the Normandy Base Section.²⁰ The Chief of the Supply Division reported on 29 August that approximately 250 unit exchanges had been established in the communications zone. Service forces were being adequately, if not well, supplied with post exchange items.²¹

On VE-day, 8 May 1945, there were more than 1,400 exchanges in the communications zone. They had sold since their inception on the Continent almost \$9,431,000 worth of merchandise. Though ADSEC had the largest number of exchanges, 243, the Seine Section was the largest retailer. It sold more than \$1,527,000 worth of post exchange supplies.²²

FOR THE ARMIES

Unfortunately, the supply of post exchange items to the armies was not as successful an operation. Tonnage and priorities were ills for which there were no cures. Palliatives, offered and tried, did little but aggravate the condition. The Chief Quartermaster told the Chief of the Army Exchange Service that the Quartermaster Service had been allocated 31,000 long tons of space aboard trains on the Continent for the first 15 days of September 1944. This was far below requirements. Of necessity, therefore, post exchange supplies would not be moved until the second half of the month. He notified the Chief of the Army Exchange Service that in the future the Army Exchange Service would determine its own requirements for tonnage and give them to G-4, who would tell the Chief Quartermaster how much to move. The Quartermaster Service would include RAC-kit tonnage in its bid for class I space.²³

These were the hectic days of the RED BALL express, the daily telegram, the credit system, and the midnight meetings of G-4 (see vol. I, ch. 4). On 7 September post exchange items, which had been a part of quartermaster class IV supply, became a separate category.²⁴ Army quartermasters were directed to send to the ADSEC quartermaster their estimated requirements of post exchange items for 15 days. Upon receipt of the estimated requirements from ADSEC, OCQM would designate a supply depot and direct it to set aside items approved for shipment to the armies. The armies would request shipment on the daily telegram.²⁵

The Chief of the Supply Division wanted a higher priority for the discharge of RAC kits. The armies, he reported on 24 October, required 1,000,000 kits a day. No kits were on hand, but

16,224,980 were either being discharged or awaiting discharge. According to the priorities then in effect, only 2,300,000 kits would be discharged during the next 2 weeks. If the priorities were not changed, it would be necessary to issue in bulk. Then neither RAC kits nor bulk supply would be available at the end of 14 days.²⁶

When the First Army asked on 26 October why it had received only 3,522,400 RAC kits against the more than 22,800,000 it had requested during September,²⁷ the Chief Quartermaster replied that pilferage could be the only explanation, for he had actually shipped 10,088,000 kits to the First Army.²⁸

By VE-day, 822 unit exchanges had been opened in the First, Third, and Ninth Armies. They had sold almost \$1,435,000 worth of post exchange supplies. Though the First Army had the largest number of exchanges, 315, the Ninth Army was the largest retailer. It sold upwards of \$700,000 worth of merchandise.²⁹ A later report showed that the Seventh Army had sold \$665,625 worth of post exchange supplies through 123 exchanges. The Fifteenth Army sold \$60,843 worth of post exchange supplies through 37 exchanges.³⁰

DISTRIBUTING THE SUPPLIES

The first of a series of over-all quartermaster supply plans that were worked out to conform to rapidly changing tactical situations was published on 30 October 1944. The important port of Le Havre had been opened on 2 October. The opening of Antwerp was expected momentarily. The line of communications had been so lengthened that intermediate depots were imperative. Thus for the first time depots were designated base or port depots and intermediate depots.

The Plan of October 1944

Normally, all post exchange supplies received at Cherbourg would be transported to the depots at Cherbourg, Verdun, Liege, and Paris; those received at Le Havre, to Liege; and those received at Antwerp, to Liege and Verdun. The intermediate depot at Liege would supply the First and Ninth Armies and part of ADSEC. The intermediate depot at Verdun would supply the Third Army and another part of ADSEC. The base depot at Cherbourg would supply the Normandy and Brittany Base Sections and the Loire Section. The Le Havre base depot would supply the Channel Base Section; and the Paris intermediate depot, the Oise and Seine Sections.³¹

The Plan of December 1944

By the end of November the Communications Zone was responsible for the supply of all United States forces on the Continent. It had assumed responsibility for the support of the troops in southern France when the Sixth United States Army Group was transferred to the European Theater. Then, too, the Southern Line of Communications (SOLOC) and the Continental Advance Section (CONAD) had been added to the Communications Zone supply structure. The opening of the huge port of Antwerp was imminent. The first quartermaster supplies were actually unloaded there on 3 December. The mammoth depot at Reims was already regarded as the central class II and class IV supply depot for the Continent.

Efforts to improve the supply of post exchange items forced the Chief Quartermaster to revise distribution policies. Post exchange supplies were divided into three categories. Category I consisted of the 12 items contained in the RAC kits that would be sold at post exchanges in the communications zone. Category II consisted of RAC kits or components that would be issued gratuitously in army areas. Category III consisted of all other post exchange items not included in RAC kits or in the bulk gratuitous issue. These items would be sold to all troops whether in the communications zone or in army areas.

Category I and category III items would be received at Cherbourg, Le Havre, and Antwerp and would be stored in the depots at Cherbourg, Paris, and Reims and in the dumps at Le Havre and Antwerp. The Cherbourg depot would sell them to Army Exchange Service distributing points at Cherbourg, Rennes, and Le Mans for resale in the Normandy and Brittany Base Sections. The Paris depot would sell to the Army Exchange Service distributing point in Paris for resale to the Seine Section. The dumps at Le Havre and Antwerp would sell to the Army Exchange Service distributing points at Le Havre and Antwerp for resale in the Channel Base Section. The Reims depot would sell to the Army Exchange Service distributing point at Reims for resale in the Oise Section and to Army Exchange Service distributing points at Liege and Verdun for resale in ADSEC and in army areas. The flow of category I and category III post exchange supplies appears as appendix XIV.

The distribution of category II post exchange supplies was more complicated. These items would also be received at Cherbourg, Le Havre, and Antwerp. They would be stored, however, in the depots at Cherbourg, Paris, Charleroi,

Liege, Luxembourg, and Verdun and in the dumps at Le Havre and Antwerp. Each of these depots had an intermediate and a retail mission. The intermediate mission of the Liege depot was the supply of the First and Ninth Armies; of the Luxembourg depot the supply of the Fifteenth Army; and of the Verdun depot the supply of the Third Army. Each depot would hold a 40-day level of post exchange supplies—Liege for 660,000 United States troops and 30,000 prisoners of war, Verdun and Luxembourg for 310,000 United States troops and 15,000 prisoners of war. The retail mission of the three depots was the supply of ADSEC. Reims, as an intermediate depot, would supply category III items to all armies and category I and category III items to the Oise Section and ADSEC. Its retail mission was to supply the Oise Section. It would hold a 40-day supply of category III items for 1,650,000 United States troops and 70,000 other persons. It would also hold a 40-day supply of category I items for 370,000 United States troops, 277,000 Allied prisoners of war, 130,000 enemy prisoners of war, and 70,000 other persons. Paris, as an intermediate and retail depot, would supply category I and category III items to the Seine Section. It would hold a 40-day supply for 100,000 United States troops, 17,000 Allied prisoners of war, 5,000 enemy prisoners of war, and 50,000 other persons. Cherbourg, as an intermediate depot, would hold reserves of category I and category III supplies for the Normandy and Brittany Base Section. Its retail mission was to serve the Normandy Base Section. It would hold a 40-day supply for 75,000 United States troops, 200,000 enemy prisoners of war, 127,000 Allied prisoners of war, and 50,000 other persons.³² Category II post exchange items were furnished along with rations, the flow of which appears in appendix XV.

The Plan of January 1945

The new plan published on 20 January 1945 was caused more by a change in the tactical situation than by a failure in the supply system. The German counteroffensive in the Ardennes had been overcome. The Allied armies had reestablished themselves along the lines they had held in December. German strength having been sapped, supply plans to support a swift advance to the heart of Germany were in order.

Actually, there was little difference between the plan of January 1945 and its predecessor. The Liege depot would continue to support the First and Ninth Armies and a portion of ADSEC. It would temporarily hold a 10- to 15-day supply of category II items for 900,000 persons and ultimately a 30-day supply. The

Verdun depot would continue to support the Third Army and another portion of ADSEC. It would temporarily hold a 10- to 15-day supply of category II items for 500,000 persons and ultimately a 45-day supply. The Charleroi-Mons depot would stock category II items to back up the Liege depot and supply category I and category III items to the First and Ninth Armies and part of the Channel Base Section. It would temporarily hold a 30-day supply of category II items for 900,000 persons and ultimately a 15-day supply of category II items for 900,000 persons and a 45-day supply of category I items for 600,000 persons. The Reims depot would continue to supply category III items to the Third Army. It would supply category I and category III items to the Oise Section and to the Fifteenth Army, which had been made a replacement army and stationed in the Oise Section. It would hold a 45-day supply for 500,000 army troops and 500,000 communications zone troops. The Paris depot would supply category I and category III items to the Seine Section and back up the Reims and Verdun depots. It would hold a 30-day supply of category II items for 500,000 United States troops and a 45-day supply of category I and category III items for 200,000 United States troops and other persons. The Cherbourg depot would supply category I and category III items to the Normandy Base Section. It would hold a 45-day supply for 250,000 United States troops and other persons. The Rennes depot would supply these items to the Brittany Base Section. It would hold a 45-day supply for 250,000 United States troops. The Le Havre depot would provide these items to a portion of the Channel Base Section and the RED HORSE Staging Area. It would hold a 45-day supply for 200,000 United States troops. The Antwerp distributing point would serve another part of the Channel Base Section. It would hold a 15-day supply for 75,000 United States troops.³³

The Last Operational Plans

During February and March 1945 the Chief Quartermaster issued to each section and base-section quartermaster memorandums that put into effect the system known as "supply in depth." The missions and stock of the Liege, Verdun, Paris, Reims, Rennes, Le Mans, Cherbourg, and Le Havre depots were unchanged. The Charleroi depot was designated as a filler (back up) depot for Liege and would hold a 15-day supply of category II items for 1,000,000 United States troops. It would retail category I and category III items to the Channel Base Section. To do this, it would hold a 45-day supply for 400,000 troops. It would hold also a 45-

day supply of category III items earmarked for 850,000 army troops.³⁴ The new intermediate depot in the Nancy-Metz area would supply all post exchange items to the Seventh United States Army and CONAD. It would hold a 30-day supply of category III items for 1,000,000 army troops. It would hold a 30-day level of category I items for 200,000 CONAD troops. Another new intermediate depot, Dijon, would also serve the Seventh United States Army, the French First Army, and CONAD. It would hold a 30-day supply of category II and category III items for 500,000 army troops and a 30-day supply of category I and category III items for 200,000 CONAD troops.³⁵ The base or port depot at Marseille would serve the Sixth Army Group and the Delta Base Section. It would hold a 15-day supply of category II and category III items for 1,000,000 army troops and a 45-day supply of category I and category III items for 500,000 Delta Base Section troops.³⁶

Post-Hostilities Plans

The Chief Quartermaster issued another series of memorandums after VE-day. These assigned post exchange missions to the depots that would remain open on the Continent to support the armies of occupation. Each of the base depots—Bremen, Antwerp, Marseille, Charleroi, and Le Havre—would hold a 60-day supply for the troops in its area. Each of the filler depots — Paris, Verdun, and Reims—would hold a 45-day supply for Berlin and the troops in its area. The United States occupational forces in the western military district would be supplied through the Kassel-Marberg depot and the Mannheim-Stuttgart-Ulm depot. Troops in the eastern military district would be supplied through the Nuremberg and Munich depots. All items would be sold through post exchanges without reference to categories.³⁷

SUMMARY OF THE PROGRAM

Troops wanted and needed post exchange supplies. They did not care who stored or distributed candy and cigarettes as long as these items were available. A front-line soldier or a laborer in a composite battalion knew little and cared less about tonnage and priorities. All the excuses of joint control, lack of transportation, and untrained personnel meant nothing when soldiers went wanting for tobacco, gum, or tooth paste. The success of the army exchange program cannot be appraised upon the basis of the more than 2,000 unit exchanges that operated throughout the European Theater or upon the basis of the widely publicized department-

store post exchanges that were opened at base section headquarters, Communications Zone headquarters, Theater headquarters, and SHAEF. It must be appraised solely upon the basis of service to the soldier. With such a measure in hand, no one can deny that the army exchange supply program left much to be desired.

The Theater General Board, created in June 1945 to prepare an analysis of the strategy, tactics, and administration of the United States Forces in the European Theater, concluded that there were three principal factors contributing to the deficient supply of post exchange items: first, lack of Army Exchange Service personnel; second, division of responsibility between the Quartermaster Service and the Army Exchange Service; and third, lack of transportation. Though the Chief of the Army Exchange Service was able to pick up some military personnel, his administrative staff at Communications Zone headquarters was largely a civilian organization. Many employees were British nationals, who had accompanied the United States forces to France. Others were French civilians, who were employed in Paris. The majority, however, were Federal employees, who were imported from the United States. As a general rule, there were not enough military or sufficient civilian personnel in base sections.

The results were incomplete service to the soldier in the field, lack of coordination between area exchange officers and Army Exchange Service headquarters, general failure to follow the standing operating procedure, lack of control over exchanges and distributing points, and faulty auditing and accounting.³³

The metropolitan exchanges operated efficiently but not without difficulties. Too frequently exchange officers did not have the proper background or experience. There were rarely enough enlisted men assigned to provide adequate service. The best post exchanges were those operated by more or less static personnel, augmented by civilian employees. Unit exchanges, particularly in army areas, were wholly inadequate. Because tables of organization for army, corps, and division headquarters made no provision for army exchange service personnel, these exchanges were operated by untrained soldiers. The most successful unit exchanges were in rest areas, recreational centers, and ground force reinforcement depots. Here combat soldiers had their first chance to break away from the monotony of RAC kits and gratuitously issued items. Yet, had it not been for these free issues, combat forces might never have received even those items essential to their comfort.

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- ³ Memorandum, CQM to QM, ADSEC, and Chief, Supply Division, 8 August 1944.
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- ⁵ Memorandum, Chief, Army Exchange Service, to CQM, 12 August 1944.
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- ⁷ *Report of Operations, First United States Army, 20 October 1943—1 August 1944*, (undated), Annex No. 4, p. 71; memorandum, Sales Store Branch, Supply Division, to QM, First United States Army, 13 July 1944; and Quartermaster Plan for Operations in France, 25 July—1 September 1944, ADSEC, 23 July 1944.
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- ¹² Memorandum, Chief Supply Division, to DCQM, 23 August 1944; and memorandum, Chief, Subsistence Division, to Chief, Plans and Training Division, 30 August 1944.
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- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 9.
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- ²² Progress Report, Com Z, ETOUSA, 31 May 1945, pp. 186-87.
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- ²⁵ Circular Letter No. 52, OCQM, 16 September 1944.
- ²⁶ Memorandum, Chief, Supply Division, to DCQM, 24 October 1944.

- ²⁷ Memorandum, G-4 to CQM, 26 October 1944.
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- ²⁹ Progress Report, Com Z, ETOUSA, 31 May 1945, pp. 186-87.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, (?) June 1945, p. 183.
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- ³² Quartermaster Supply and Storage Plan, OCQM, 1 December 1944.
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- ³⁵ Memorandum, OCQM to QM, CONAD, 17 March 1945.
- ³⁶ Memorandum, OCQM to QM, Delta Base Section, 17 March 1945.
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Figure 29.—Two Hospital-Ward Tents Sewed Together.




Figure 30.—Marquee Tents Used by Field Bakery.




Figure 31.—Supplies in Open Storage Covered by Tarpaulin Canopies.

CHAPTER 5

POST EXCHANGE SUPPLIES

World War II was a war of innovations. New methods of destroying and conquering an enemy appeared in every type of warfare. While thousands of infantrymen made their way ashore in specially designed assault boats and amphibious tanks, fleets of rocket-propelled planes and dive bombers provided a protective cover. The sky beyond the invasion beaches was dark with thousands of parachutists and glider-borne combat troops. Tacticians injected into old theories of divide and conquer such new methods of battle as pincer movements and tank spearheads. Logisticians, desperately trying to move supplies in pace with advancing armies, made use of specially constructed artificial harbors, gasoline pipe lines, and giant cargo-carrying airplanes. There were in addition many smaller and less potent innovations that time has already hidden with a cloak of obscurity.

Too often high-ranking logisticians thought of post exchange supplies as trifles. Actually post exchange supplies should have better than a nuisance-value rating. They were vital to the spirit of United States soldiers—and that spirit was vital to victory. Eight score and ten years ago the principles underlying post exchange service were incorporated in the program of the newly created Continental Army of the United States. In December 1777 a French gunboat reached America, bringing brass cannons, mortars, ammunition, and the Prussian general, Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben. At Valley Forge under von Steuben's tutelage the United States Army may be said to have had its beginning. On 5 May 1778 von Steuben was made Inspector General with the rank of major general and asked to set up a system for the Army and to describe the duties of officers and men. The regulations that he prepared were adopted by the Continental Congress in March 1779 and printed under the title "Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States Army." Because of its blue binding, the volume was known as the Blue Book. The commander's greatest ambition, according to these first regulations, should be to have his regiment "at all times and in every respect as complete as possible." Therefore, "the soldier's health should be the first and greatest care, He [the commander] must have a watchful eye over the officers of companies, that they may pay the necessary attention to their men." The captain should "gain the love

of his men by treating them with every possible kindness and humanity, . . . and procure them, besides, such comforts and conveniences as are in his power." The Army Exchange Service in World War II was the agency that put into operation the principles enunciated by the founder of United States Army discipline.

MAGAZINES AND WRITING PAPER

According to an official of the United Service Organization, the soldier of World War II was the "readingest and writingest man that this country ever produced." He was avid to get his hands on books, magazines, newspapers—anything that smelled of wood pulp and printer's ink. He was forever writing letters to anyone and everyone, to the girl he had met at last night's dance, as well as to the girl he had left behind him. It was not until the advent of twentieth century warfare that the Army included the provision of reading and writing materials as a service it should render fighting men.

American men in the United Kingdom were not content to be supplied with only British publications. They wanted word direct from home—the old familiar magazines that gave the low-down on American politicians, ball players, prize fighters, and motion-picture stars. Yet granting their wish involved a struggle. United States forces had been in Great Britain less than 2 months on 16 March 1942, when the Ministry of Supply refused paper and license for the publication of *Time* magazine in Great Britain. Because newsprint was short, the Comptroller of Paper had prohibited the publication of any periodical that had not been printed in England before August 1940. The only exceptions to this rule were *Stars and Stripes* and *Yank*, which were printed by commercial firms in Great Britain. Paper for *Stars and Stripes* was provided by the Ministry, but paper for *Yank* was imported from the United States.¹

Soon after the Army Exchange Service and the Quartermaster Service were combined, Brigadier General Littlejohn became interested in the possibility of distributing *Time* and *Newsweek* to United States forces in the United Kingdom. In fact, the publisher of *Time* offered in November 1942 to establish a plant in England and publish his magazine for troops on a noncommercial basis.² Nothing came of the

proposal, however, because of the Ministry of Supply's earlier decision.

In March 1943 the Chief Quartermaster took the bull by the horns. He wrote Brigadier General Joseph Byron, Director of the Army Exchange Service, that United States forces in Europe should get about three or four of the most popular magazines in the United States. Publishers should send master copies of these magazines by air and arrange to have them reproduced in the United Kingdom. Editions for the armed forces would not be illustrated or carry advertising. All the magazines would be about the same size and have the same general type style.³

Though *The Reader's Digest* was being published in Great Britain before 1940, it had not been made available to the United States forces. At first, the Chief Quartermaster was not certain that it should be, for it was printed on cheap paper in small print.⁴ He changed his mind, however, in March 1943 and asked for 10,000 copies of the April issue. The British office of *The Reader's Digest* was willing to provide the magazine but was not certain that the home office at Pleasantville, New York, would approve. Though His Majesty's Stationery Office, which controlled paper, agreed to produce the magazine free of charge, the British Treasury asked for time to consider the matter.⁵ The Chief Quartermaster believed he had won a major victory when the home office of *The Reader's Digest* gave its permission to distribute the April issue to United States soldiers. His joy was shortlived, for the Ministry of Supply refused to release the needed paper.⁶

Efforts to have *Time* and *Newsweek* published in the Theater ran into the same difficulty. The Ministry of Supply reiterated its earlier decision that no paper would be allocated for periodicals that had not been published in Great Britain before 1940. Major General Frank M. Andrews, Commanding General of the European Theater, considering this declaration irrevocable, said that he would press the matter no further.⁷ Brigadier General Littlejohn, however, refused to take no for an answer. Though he appreciated the viewpoint of the Ministry of Supply, he believed that cheap newsprint could be made from wheat and straw and suggested that the General Purchasing Agent convey this proposal to the British War Office.⁸

Help came from an unsolicited source in mid-April 1943. Edward B. Lockett, the London representative of *Time* and *Life*, announced that his company had agreed to ship without cost to the United States Government enough pony (miniature) editions of *Time* to make adequate

distribution to soldiers in England. These pony editions were printed on thin paper and carried no advertising.⁹ More than 28,000 copies of *Time* left New York on 25 April and reached the British Isles about 10 May. All had been distributed to troops before 20 May 1943.¹⁰ By a similar arrangement deliveries of *Newsweek* began with the 28 June 1943 issue. The British Ministry of Supply finally agreed in June 1943 to release enough paper to print 5,000 copies of *The Reader's Digest* monthly. These magazines were turned over to quartermaster depots for resale through post exchanges. Deliveries began with the July 1943 edition.¹¹

There were no further complications until December 1943. Then the War Department announced that it would cooperate on an impartial basis with commercial newspaper and magazine publishers to produce special editions for United States troops overseas. Each publisher would provide the necessary paper from the allotments given him by the War Production Board. The War Department would merely notify the War Production Board of these arrangements and would not intervene in behalf of any publisher. Commanding generals of overseas theaters would help publishers obtain local printing facilities. They would establish priorities for the shipment of paper by water and for the shipment of plastic plates or mats by air. Publishers and theater commanders would determine whether publications would be sold or distributed free.¹²

This letter had immediate repercussions in the European Theater. Virtually every major publication in the United States wanted to jump on the band wagon. The London representative of *The Chicago Tribune* said on 28 December that plastic plates and paper could be shipped from the United States within 24 hours.¹³ The London representative of *Time* said that his company was ready to print 50,000 copies as soon as arrangements could be completed.¹⁴ The Theater Commander was so harassed that he cabled the War Department for advice, pointing out that the British had continually resisted the publication of American magazines in Great Britain for several reasons. First, newsprint was exceedingly short. Second, permission to print a few magazines in England would open the door to all United States periodicals. Third, the printing of these periodicals would likely create an unfavorable public reaction because British newspapers and magazines had been drastically reduced in format and content. It seemed wise, therefore, to modify the War Department's blanket order.¹⁵

When the War Department replied that the policy would be modified,¹⁶ the Chief Quarter-

master made a survey to determine the extent to which United States periodicals could be reproduced in Great Britain. He found that the Ministry of Supply had restricted publishers to 22½ percent of the paper they had received before the war. He also learned that the Ministry of Labor was definitely against the proposal. Finally, His Majesty's Stationery Office and the Comptroller of Paper reported that bulk paper could not be made available. Major General Littlejohn concluded, therefore, that the entire project should be given up, at least temporarily, and that shipment from the United States should be continued.¹⁷

Nothing further was done until the Communications Zone was well established on the Continent. Then the Quartermaster Service and the Special Services Division were able to arrange for *Time*, *Newsweek*, and *The Reader's Digest* to be printed in Paris. These were reproduced from offset plates flown from New York. Most of the work was done in the Paris plant of the *New York Herald-Tribune*, which was reopened late in 1944. After VE-day 25 or more magazines were sold in post exchanges.

Paper shortage in the United Kingdom threatened now and then to restrict American soldiers' epistolary activities. The all-powerful Comptroller of Stationery had to be dealt with in the procurement of all types of paper—toilet paper, office stationery, and paper for personal correspondence. Soon after the European Theater of Operations was established, Colonel D. C. MacKeachie, General Purchasing Agent, entered into negotiations with the British War Office. At a meeting held in early July 1942 representatives of the Comptroller of Stationery, the Ministry of Supply, the Ministry of Production, the Director of Army Requirements, His Majesty's Stationery Office, and the BOLERO Combined Committee agreed that all requirements of stationery would be provided under reverse lend-lease by His Majesty's Comptroller of Stationery. The agreement covered the supply of envelopes and writing paper for soldiers' personal correspondence. Instructions were to be issued to the New York Port of Embarkation to stop further shipments of paper.¹⁸

Toward the end of July the quantity of paper in the hands of American forces was so low that the Chief of the Supply Division was requested to make an urgent demand on the British for immediate delivery.¹⁹ By a fortuitous oversight paper and ink were then on their way from the United States, for requisitions were not canceled until 20 August 1942.²⁰ Meanwhile, arrangements had been made for the Quartermaster Service to process all stationery pro-

cured through His Majesty's Comptroller of Stationery.²¹ Orders were to be placed in wholesale quantities well in advance of needs, and supplies were to be stored in United States depots.²² Because paper was far from plentiful, United States forces were instructed to use it sparingly, even to the extent of typing on both sides of onionskin second sheets.²³ Incidentally, the eyes of later-day historians bear testimony that the order was interpreted literally.

Like many another promise that the British made in good faith and with high hopes of their ability to fulfill, the agreement to supply paper could not be carried out. Early in January 1944 Colonel Wayne R. Allen, then General Purchasing Agent, sent an earnest appeal to Colonel N. G. Scorgie, Comptroller of Stationery. At one time the supply of paper from the British had been adequate, he said, but now it seemed that requisitions must be placed on the United States. This reversal of policy would bring about the use of more ship tons and the relaxing of those austere standards that were later to distress historians.²⁴ Before Colonel Scorgie had time to reply, Colonel J. B. Franks, Deputy Chief Quartermaster, directed that the New York Port of Embarkation be asked to come to the rescue.²⁵ The story of writing-paper supply to soldiers in the European Theater of Operations has an ending known to all American families. Millions of letters that bore on their envelopes the magic word "Free" winged their way across the Atlantic written on stationery acceptable to the recipients.

SOFT DRINKS AND BEER

The comfort of the United States Army demanded many items that could not have entered into Baron von Steuben's paternalistic program. American youths, whether from New York City or Gopher Prairie, took with them to Europe fondness for the charged drinks served in corner drug stores or at roadside service stations. They did not have to be of German descent to welcome bottles of the brew that Milwaukee made famous. A way had to be found to quench their thirst with cold drinks that "cheer but not inebriate" or that cheer and inebriate only a little.

Soft Drinks

Coca-Cola and Pearl Harbor entered the American scene at approximately the same time. Coca-Cola was born in Atlanta in 1886. The United States acquired rights in Pearl Harbor in 1887. Coca-Cola is as American as baseball. For the soldier it was to morale what food and clothing were to physical well-being. Con-

sequently, on 17 March 1942 a meeting was held in Belfast to discuss plans for supplying Coca-Cola to United States forces stationed in Northern Ireland.

Neither Lieutenant Colonel Edmund M. Bar-num, Army Exchange Service Officer, USAFBI, nor the local representatives of the Coca-Cola Company were sure of their ground. The one small plant in Northern Ireland could not turn out at peak production more than 12,000 cases a month. Then, too, personnel and supplies were inadequate. The shortage of sugar appeared to be an insurmountable obstacle, for the main office of the Coca-Cola Company would not sanction the use of saccharin. Prices and profits caused some concern. Lieutenant Colonel Bar-num frankly admitted that he could not estimate his requirements. He merely knew that troops from the South drank about four to six Coca-Colas a day and that troops from the North drank less. Though it might be possible to get another plant from the United States, he could make no commitment. He also thought that sirup might be shipped from the United States. He did give assurance, however, that the Coca-Cola people would not be left "holding the sack" but warned that he would not tolerate speculation. The primary concern was to get Coca-Cola to the forces as quickly as possible. Though he feared he was catering more to whim than to needs, he admitted that United States soldiers had been practically brought up on Coca-Cola.²⁶

At another meeting on 28 July representatives of the American Red Cross, the Catering Division of the Ministry of Food, and the United States Army decided that concentrates of Coca-Cola, Pepsi-Cola, and Green Spot Orange would be imported from the United States; that sugar would be made available by the Ministry of Food; and that drinks would be bottled at various plants in the United Kingdom. No new bottles or caps would be made. The drinks would not be labeled. The Ministry of Food would arrange for production and distribution.²⁷

Beer

Meanwhile, arrangements had been made for the supply of beer to the United States forces. Army officials did not want British beer, which one imaginative soldier described as a combination of Drano and lukewarm dishwater; they wanted lager or pale ale. The Ministry of Food stated that only stout or porter could be supplied. If lager was to be brewed, the United States forces would have to import indefinite amounts of hops and malt, 2,500,000 beer bottles, 30,000,000 caps, 125,000 cases or barrels,

and technicians to install and operate 30 bottling units.²⁸ The Ministry of Food was more definite toward the end of July about the amount of supplies needed. In order to produce 600,000 barrels of beer a year, or enough to furnish each man half a pint of beer a day, the United States forces would have to import 400 tons of hops and 15,000 tons of malt or 20,000 tons of barley. Breweries in Great Britain were taking care of immediate requirements by using stocks on hand with the assurance that the supplies would be replaced later by the United States.²⁹

Procedures

Procedure for the procurement of soft drinks and beer was published on 30 November 1942. Coca-Cola, Pepsi-Cola, fruit drinks, and beer were to be made available through the sales stores. Sales officers would requisition on designated distribution depots, which would determine the bottler from whom supplies were to be drawn. Sales officers would see that bottles, cases, and kegs were returned to the bottler or brewery. There would be no rebate on bottles and crates, which were furnished by OCQM, because the drinks would be issued on a bottle-for-bottle basis.³⁰

After a 2-month trial the procedure was found to be unsatisfactory on several counts. The return of bottles was not properly controlled. The red tape was annoying. Sales officers had to make not only a trip to a depot to obtain the proper forms but also a trip to a brewery. For this reason many organizations were bypassing depots and working out their own arrangements with brewers and bottlers.³¹

New directives were published in May 1943 after the Army Exchange Service was reorganized. Both beer and soft drinks would be sold through post exchanges at the rate of one pint of beer and one bottle of Coca-Cola or Pepsi-Cola per man per day. Distribution depots would requisition stocks of soft drinks from the Procurement Division, OCQM. They would be held accountable for bottles and crates and would be charged for bottle losses of more than 30 percent. These depots would be served by local bottlers. Post exchange officers would obtain beer direct from brewers under regulations prescribed by the Chief of the Army Exchange Service. Quartermaster depots or quartermaster sections in general depots would be concerned with the supply of beer only to the following extent: They would authorize post exchange officers to obtain beer; they would designate the brewers from whom supplies were to be drawn; they would compute the monthly gallonage allowed each post exchange; and they

would keep records of supplies drawn. Brewers would be selected from a list of about 50 located throughout the United Kingdom.³²

Soft-Drink Problems

Conditions in the United Kingdom made it impossible to put into practice part of the theory contained in these new directives. In the spring of 1943 there were no more than five Coca-Cola and nine Pepsi-Cola bottling companies in Great Britain.³³ By summer the situation had become even worse. Because depots were getting only about 25 percent of their soft-drink requirements, the allowance was reduced to two bottles per man per week. The Chief of the Procurement Division stated that unless the Army Exchange Service imported sirup and dispensers from the United States, it would be necessary to abandon the idea of furnishing cola drinks to troops.³⁴ Nevertheless, sirup was not imported until February 1944.³⁵

Meanwhile, other problems had arisen. The British soft-drink industry reported that depots were requisitioning more than they actually needed and expressed fear that production demands could not be met if the weather should turn warm suddenly. The spokesman for the industry explained that in wartime a staff could not be held in factories to meet possible future demands. Labor could not be obtained until the Ministry of Labor was certain that it was needed. Though instructions issued by the United States headquarters had resulted in improvement in the return of containers, some depots still held an unreasonably high number of bottles and cases. Because the rapid turnaround of containers was essential to the production of cola, the industry suggested that requisitions be related more closely to actual needs. Supplies should be made to units on a strict "fulls-for-empties" basis.³⁶

Problems Solved

The Army Exchange Service came to the rescue of the soft-drink problem in the summer of 1944 by suggesting that unit exchanges deal directly with bottlers. This scheme would allow a quicker turnover of bottles and crates and reduce bottle breakage. There were by that time 65 bottling plants in the United Kingdom but only 28 soft-drink depots. Sometimes a unit exchange only a few miles from a bottling plant had to procure its supplies from a depot 20 miles or more away.³⁷ Though the Chief of the Procurement Division agreed that this procedure would be desirable from all standpoints,³⁸ the Chief of the Sales Store Branch insisted that it was not practicable to entirely eliminate control by depots.³⁹

The system was satisfactorily worked out toward the end of June. Soft drinks would be distributed in both ways. In all cases depots would make necessary arrangements with unit exchanges to assure the return of all bottles and cases to the depot or bottler. No unit exchanges would be furnished additional cola unless bottles and cases delivered the previous month had been returned.⁴⁰

Plans for Continent

At the same time plans were under way to provide soft drinks and beer to troops on the Continent. OCQM requisitioned 17,800,000 cans of beer from the United States until breweries should be available.⁴¹ Coca-Cola bottling plants would also be operated. Though they were the property of the Coca-Cola Company, they would be under the supervision of the Army Exchange Service. The bottling plants would be set up on the Continent after D-plus-30-day. Plans were made to requisition from the United States all the necessary technical advisers, as well as equipment, cooperage, ice coolers, carbon-dioxide cylinders, tools, 400,000 cases of bottled cola, and 25,680 barrels of sirup. The bottled cola was scheduled for delivery by D-plus-150-day.⁴²

On the Continent

When the requisition for the canned beer was turned down because of the shortage of shipping space,⁴³ the Chief of the Army Exchange Service decided that no beer or cola equipment and supplies should be scheduled for delivery to the Continent. Instead, manufacturers should procure the equipment and supplies in the United States and hold them in reserve until shipping space could be allotted.⁴⁴

On 10 July, however, Major General Littlejohn in great stress wrote G-4. He had learned that NAAFI expected within a week to sell to British troops beer that would be imported from the United Kingdom and from the United States. So British soldiers would soon have beer and United States soldiers would have none. The effect on morale would be dangerous, and public sentiment in the United States would be aroused. Both draught and bottled beer could be supplied from existing breweries, he said, if equipment and cooperage were imported. The Army Exchange Service had informed him that 7,124 long tons of supplies could produce 13,213,000 pints of beer by 15 November 1944.⁴⁵ G-4 at first stood firm in its decision that these supplies should not displace war material⁴⁶ but a few days later allocated 5,000 ship tons per month to beer and cola.⁴⁷

On 10 August 1944 the Quartermaster Service requisitioned from the United States 1,072,000 gallons of Coca-Cola sirup, 1,019,000 bottle caps, 12,704 pounds of carbon-dioxide gas, 244,500 pounds of caustic soda, 9,840,000 bottles of Coca-Cola, and 5 Coca-Cola bottling plants. The first 2 plants were to be shipped during September, the last during December. Supplies for the other plants should be shipped by 31 May 1945.⁴⁸

Final Procedures

Shortly after the requisition was placed, the Chief Quartermaster and the Chief of the Army Exchange Service worked out a detailed plan for the supply of soft drinks and beer to the United States forces on the Continent. This plan was a mutual agreement rather than a statement of official action.

The Quartermaster Service would procure, store, and issue supplies and equipment for the manufacture of soft drinks and beer on the Continent. The Army Exchange Service would establish and operate bottling plants and breweries and would sell beer and soft drinks through post exchanges. The Quartermaster Service would deliver to places designated by the Army Exchange Service the equipment that had been requisitioned from the United States. The Army Exchange Service would operate these plants to meet the following production schedule:

Soft Drinks		
Month	Allowance per Man per Month (bottles)	Total (bottles)
October	3.3	6,420,000
November	5.0	10,866,800
December	5.6	12,900,000
January	6.6	15,396,000
February	8.0	18,510,000
March	8.0	18,510,000
April	8.0	18,510,000
May	8.0	18,510,000

Beer		
Month	Allowance per Man per Month (pints)	Total (pints)
October	1.5	2,820,864
November	1.5	2,857,920
December	1.5	3,440,256
January	1.5	3,650,496
February	4.0	9,130,752
March	4.5	9,706,752
April	4.5	9,706,752
May	4.5	9,706,752

The Quartermaster Service would provide personnel to requisition, store, and issue beer, soft drinks, and equipment. The Army Exchange Service would provide personnel to operate bottling plants and breweries. French labor would be used. G-4 would allocate approximately 5,000 ship tons each month to bring beer and soft-drink supplies to the Continent. The Army Exchange Service would estimate tonnage requirements and send these requirements to OCQM. The Quartermaster Service would request space for these supplies. The Quartermaster Service would deliver supplies to Army Exchange Service distributing points. The Army Exchange Service would store these supplies near bottling plants and breweries at Cherbourg, Avranches, Rennes, Le Mans, and Paris. Other plants and breweries would be opened later. The Army Exchange Service would maintain authorized levels of supply and make monthly inventories. It would provide all transportation to move supplies from quartermaster depots, dismantle and erect bottling plants, and enlist the help of the Engineer Service to rehabilitate breweries. The Quartermaster Service and the Army Exchange Service would cooperate to procure cooperage. They would be jointly responsible for the salvage and disposition of excess beer and soft-drink supplies. The Army Exchange Service would negotiate contracts with local manufacturers for the production of 3.2 pale ale and soft drinks. The Army Exchange Service would import yeast, and the Quartermaster Service would store it. The Army Exchange Service would establish the price of beer and soft drinks. Cola drinks would be 5 cents a bottle or 80 cents a case. Beer would sell at cost. The Quartermaster Service would handle government-owned beer and soft-drink supplies without reference to the Army Exchange Service. The Army Exchange Service would pay the Quartermaster Service for all supplies and equipment.⁴⁹

Achievements

By May 1945 there were 448 beer bars and 394 soda fountains in the European Theater. Cumulative sales at beer bars totaled \$387,802 and at soda fountains, \$246,741.⁵⁰ A report, prepared in June 1945, listed 5 beer bars and 2 soda fountains in the Seventh Army and 9 beer bars and 9 soda fountains in the Fifteenth Army. By that time beer sales had risen to \$543,290 and soda sales to \$333,698.⁵¹

On 31 May 1945, 47 breweries and 11 bottling plants were in operation on the Continent and bottling plants were under construction at Rouen and Reims. Against the maximum re-



Figure 32.—Pyramidal Tents House Troops and Tarpaulins Cover Supplies.





Figure 33.—British Fort and Castle That Housed Troops.



Figure 34.—Latrine Screen with One Section Omitted.

quirement of 60,192,000 twelve-ounce servings of beer per month, the Army Exchange Service had been able to produce 24,480,000 twelve-ounce servings. Increased production was dependent upon three factors: the supply of co-opeage, the supply of coal, and the supply of beer-dispensing equipment. Though coopeage had been requisitioned from Germany, it had not yet been delivered. The General Purchasing Agent had approved a coal requirement of 1,800 tons for the month of June 1945. Dispensing equipment had been ordered from the United States in February 1945. In the meantime it was being procured in Germany, France, and Switzerland.

Beer bars and soda fountains for armies and base sections were distributed as follows:

Organization	Beer Bars	Soda Fountains
First Army	41	44
Third Army	6	8
Ninth Army	56	57
ADSEC	38	32
Channel Base Section	15	19
Normandy Base Section	57	27
Seine Section	30	33
Oise Section	34	24
CONAD	20	8
Delta Base Section	1	1
United Kingdom	150	141
Total	448	394

Though the authorized allowance of soft drinks for a 15-day period amounted to 39,922,992 bottles, based on a troops strength of 3,060,000 men, the demand for soft drinks had not approached the production capacity of the 11 bottling plants. The list of breweries and bottling plants was as follows:

Breweries

Location	Number	Capacity in 12-ounce Servings (thousands)
Channel Base Section	8	11,520
Normandy Base Section	9	3,168
Seine Section	4	2,304
Oise Section	23	12,960
Delta Base Section	3	8,640
Total	47	38,592

Bottling Plants

Location	Number	15-day Capacity in 24-bottle Cases (cases)
Channel Base Section	3	68,500
Lille		
Brussels		
Spa		
Normandy Base Section	1	7,000
Rennes		
Seine Section	2	112,000
Paris (2)		
Oise Section	1	6,000
Nancy		
Delta Base Section	3	45,000
Marseille (2)		
Nice		
Germany	1	50,000
Niedermendig		
Total	11	288,500 ⁵²

LIQUOR

Every soldier of the American Revolutionary Army was entitled to a liquor ration. Though the supply of rum was pitifully short in 1777,⁵³ the Continental Congress, in a benevolent mood, ordered 30 hogsheads of rum to be distributed among the soldiers in appreciation of their gallantry at the Battle of Brandywine.⁵⁴

The First Congress of the United States decreed on 30 April 1790 that the army ration include a half gill of spirits each day. On 16 July 1798 the ration was increased to a full gill. Though a year later it was reset at a half gill, the commander-in chief was allowed to issue an extra half gill to troops engaged in heavy construction or similar work.⁵⁵ Liquor continued to be a component of the army ration until 1832. Then by executive order it was replaced by sugar and coffee. Liquor was still authorized, however, for troops engaged in heavy outdoor work.⁵⁶ Though sutlers, post traders, and post exchanges were forbidden to sell liquor, the Army itself continued to provide brandy, rum, and whisky to soldiers until 1901. Then the Subsistence Department was prohibited from buying any malt, vinous, or spiritous liquors.⁵⁷

Prohibition sentiment was at flood tide during World War I. Though the eighteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution was not effective until 16 January 1920, the Congress submitted it to the legislatures of the several states on 18 December 1917. The twenty-first amendment, which repealed the eighteenth, became law on 5 December 1933. So the way was

paved for the United States Army to provide liquor to troops who served in World War II.

Not long after the European Theater was established, Major General John C. H. Lee directed the Chief Quartermaster to make arrangements with several British agencies for the supply of liquor to United States forces. At first, the Distillers' Association, dealing directly with Mr. Charles J. Lytle, a dollar-a-year man employed by SOS, ETOUSA, supplied liquor to officers' messes at the rate of half a bottle per officer per month.⁵⁵ This procedure was unsatisfactory for several reasons. First, it actually committed the United States Army to the liquor traffic. Second, it placed an added burden on military transportation. Third, officers' messes in and near London received more liquor than those in the field. In August 1943, therefore, OCQM turned the entire problem over to NAAFI. This organization became the middleman between the Distillers' Association and the United States forces.⁵⁶

On 3 May 1944 the War Department announced that arrangements had been made to supply liquor from the United States. These arrangements would be effective only when liquor could not be obtained through the Army Exchange Service or procured locally. Consolidated requisitions, which would be sent monthly to appropriate ports in the United States, would be accompanied by sufficient funds to cover the cost of the merchandise, taxes, ocean freight charges, marine and war-risk insurance, and a 1 percent charge for incidental expenses. Shipments would be made only when they would not interfere with shipments of military supplies and equipment.⁵⁷

Elated over the news that the War Department officially sanctioned the procurement of liquor, Major General Littlejohn wrote the North African Theater that he had arranged with NAAFI to supply officers in the Mediterranean area.⁵⁸ Colonel William H. Middleswart, Quartermaster of SOS, NATOUSA, had already taken care of the matter, however. Arrangements that he had made with the New York Port of Embarkation were effective not only in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations but in the Southern Line of Communications as well.⁵⁹

No enlisted men were entitled to a liquor ration until July 1945. Then the first three grades were given a quota. Until that time the Chief Quartermaster merely had to find ways to distribute liquor to officers and dispose of ever-increasing profits. On 28 July he learned that the United States Army had realized a profit of more than \$80,000 from the sale of liquor

to officers. He suggested, therefore, that an "Eisenhower-Lee Fund" be created for the support of descendants of United States soldiers in Britain and for the education of British children in American institutions.⁶⁰ The War Department urged, however, that the money be turned into a Theater Central Welfare Fund to be used in the creation of a welfare and recreational program for the postwar army.⁶¹ Such a fund was established on 6 February 1945.⁶²

After VE-day liquor poured into the Continent from Britain and the United States. In addition, the Chief Quartermaster negotiated with the French for 500,000 bottles of cognac or armagnac to be delivered each month.⁶³ So involved had the program become that a special section, class VI supplies, was created in the Procurement Division.⁶⁴

The question as to whether NAAFI should continue to supply liquor to the army of occupation became one of the most controversial issues of the Theater postwar program. Lieutenant Colonel Floyd W. Oliphant, who was in charge of procuring liquor from the United States for SOLOC, wrote, "I feel that I would prefer to go to the Pacific rather than handle this 'red hot' theater program which requires such exactitude, and is subject to condemnation by all ranks with the minimum amount of credit for efforts expended."⁶⁵ The crux of the argument was this. United States forces that had been supplied by SOLOC were receiving liquor from the United States. Those that had been supplied by the Communications Zone received liquor through NAAFI. Rumblings began when SOLOC was made part of ETOUSA in November 1944. The Chief Quartermaster was able to pacify NAAFI, which naturally wanted a monopoly on the liquor trade, by explaining that the SOLOC supply system remained intact. The eruption came when SOLOC was dissolved in February 1945. NAAFI threatened to cancel all arrangements at the expiration of its contract in July 1945 unless it was made the sole distribution agency for the United States forces. In other words, the arrangements that Brigadier General Middleswart had made with the New York port should be discontinued. The Chief Quartermaster, using tact and diplomacy, brought about an amicable solution by keeping both systems.⁶⁶

The Supreme Commander directed on 1 July 1945 that both officers and noncommissioned officers receive wine and liquor, which would be distributed through officers' and noncommissioned officers' clubs. Each person would be allowed monthly one bottle of whisky, one bottle of gin, one bottle of champagne, and half a

bottle of liqueur. Whisky and gin, supplied by NAAFI, would sell for about \$1.50 and \$1.16 a fifth respectively. No price was set for imported whisky. Champagne would sell for not less than \$2.00 and not more than \$4.20 a quart. Each purchasing unit would pay for liquor at the NAAFI warehouse. Issues would be made on a "fulls-for-empties" basis. War correspondents and UNRRA, the American Red Cross, and the United States Government employees who had relative officer rank were also permitted a liquor ration.⁷⁰ This privilege was never given to enlisted personnel below the grade of sergeant.

CIGARETTES

The cigarette problem began in October 1944 when the First Army was battling for Aachen and the Third Army was engaged in the bitter struggle around Nancy and Metz. Though the vital port of Le Havre had been opened, it had not been operating long enough to alleviate the congested supply system. Supplies still had to be delivered by train and truck from the Normandy beaches and Cherbourg. This arrangement naturally caused no end of trouble. To keep his army equipped, Lieutenant General George S. Patton virtually engaged the Communications Zone in hand-to-hand battle. Reports of dire need for all types of supplies, from blankets to shells for howitzers, poured in from the Twelfth Army Group. Among them were repeated requests for more cigarettes. At first OCQM did little but make polite excuses and promises to do better when the transportation conditions should improve.⁷¹

When the Chief of the Army Exchange Service suggested that the ration for communications zone troops be reduced from 7 to 5 packages per week,⁷² the Chief Quartermaster decided that the time had come to look into the situation. Lying offshore were ships loaded with cigarettes and other post exchange supplies. They could not be unloaded because G-4, which established priorities, had ordained that ammunition, food, and construction material be discharged first. Consequently, OCQM, finding wisdom in the old adage that a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush, directed that bulk stocks of cigarettes be taken out of communications zone depots and sent to the armies. Colonel Robert J. Marshburn, Chief of the Army Exchange Service, was furious. He wanted to know why he had not been consulted and how he could be expected to bid for tonnage when he did not know the status of supplies.⁷³ Because he got no response from OCQM, he complained to G-1. He said the Chief Quartermaster indiscriminately took Army Exchange Service supplies and did what he pleased with

them. Stocks of cigarettes for communications zone exchanges were practically exhausted.⁷⁴ The Chief Quartermaster replied that the distribution of bulk post exchange supplies was a quartermaster responsibility. He would handle it in any way he saw fit. Army requirements were going to be met first regardless of the consequences. Furthermore, Army Exchange Service liaison officers in OCQM had been aware of the plan. If they had not told Colonel Marshburn, that was his problem. Major General Littlejohn said, however, that in the future he would try to keep the Army Exchange Service informed.⁷⁵

Meanwhile the cigarette problem was going from bad to worse. The cigarette ration for troops in the front lines, army areas, hospitals, and rest areas, and in reinforcement centers was reduced to five packages a week when available. The ration for communications zone forces was reduced to two packages a week.⁷⁶ The Chief Quartermaster appointed a board of officers to analyze the entire cigarette question. These gentlemen, making their report on 27 November, blamed the shortage on four things. First, the New York port had shipped only 70 percent of the ration accessory convenience (RAC) kits requisitioned by OCQM. Second, the United States was not able to step up cigarette production because of labor trouble and lack of materials. Third, bulk cigarettes were issued gratuitously in place of RAC kits. Fourth, the priority system was faulty. Actually about 150,000,000 packages of cigarettes, a 60-day supply, were waiting to be discharged or moved. Only a 10- to 15-day supply, however, was on shore, and only a 3½-day supply was available for the armies. The board offered only one solution. G-4 would have to give cigarettes a higher priority. There could be no relief until transportation was made available.⁷⁷

Armies, regiments, companies, and soldiers used their own devices to obtain cigarettes, finding official action less effective than ingenuity. A comparison of the methods used by the 2d Armored Division of the Ninth Army and the Ninth Air Force illustrates the failure of the orthodox approach. The Commanding General of the 2d Armored Division reported on 15 November that his troops had been receiving short tobacco rations since July 1944. With the holiday season near at hand, he wanted to know if it would be possible to give his troops a Christmas present in the form of the cigarettes due them.⁷⁸ The Commanding General of the XIX Corps not only praised the idea but suggested that the entire corps receive the same benefaction. Since the beginning of operations the corps had been issued an average of only 69 percent of its allocated tobacco ration.

The men should get what was due them, he thought, even if rear-echelon forces had to suffer.⁷⁹ Lieutenant General William Simpson, Commanding General of the Ninth Army, wanted the idea adopted for the whole army. His troops had received, he said, only 23 packages of cigarettes per man since 25 October.⁸⁰ Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley, Commanding General of the Twelfth United States Army Group, asked General Eisenhower if something could not be done to help this worthy cause.⁸¹ When Lieutenant General Lee directed the Army Exchange Service to take immediate action,⁸² Colonel Marshburn replied that he was powerless because bulk gratuitous issue was a quartermaster responsibility.⁸³ Major General Littlejohn said regretfully that he could not assure delivery of the cigarettes, because distribution depended upon supply from the United Kingdom. If the cigarettes could be unloaded and moved, they would be issued.⁸⁴

The Commanding General of the Ninth Air Force in England used an entirely different approach. He gave his units permission to fly to the Continent and draw cigarettes from bulk stocks there. When OCQM learned that the Army Exchange Service had approved this procedure, it demanded that the practice be stopped at once. Requests should be made through normal channels.⁸⁵ Members of the Ninth Air Force, however, had received the cigarettes.

The distribution of cigarettes continued to be one of the most publicized fiascos of the European Theater until January 1945. Major General Littlejohn, in reply to many vitriolic attacks by the press at home and abroad, contended that men were failing to get cigarettes because of his inability to move stocks on hand and not because of a shortage. Soldiers would continue to be without cigarettes until G-4 could remove restrictions on the discharge of nonessential supplies.⁸⁶

The repulse of the Ardennes break-through put an end to the cigarette problem. G-4 then allowed the discharge of cigarettes and allocated transportation space across the Continent. On 1 January 1945 the weekly ration was raised to seven packages for combat troops and five packages for communications zone troops.⁸⁷ All troops were receiving seven packages a week by VE-day.

SHOES FOR OFFICERS

Finally Major General Littlejohn realized his goal of dressing every officer in the Theater in the ETO field uniform. Those who had the opportunity to promenade along the streets of Paris were resplendent in their woolen field

jackets, matching trousers, and shiny new low-quarter shoes. The development of the ETO field uniform is traced in volume III of this series. The acquisition of low-quarter shoes for officers is part of the post exchange story.

So many problems had arisen during the first month of fighting on the Continent that on 3 July 1944 a representative of OCQM was sent to the United States to acquaint The Quartermaster General with the difficulties in Europe. The Chief Quartermaster wanted each officer to have at least one good pair of low-quarter shoes. These were not to be the cheap, tan low-quarter shoes, which he claimed he and Colonel Florshheim had developed while still in the Office of The Quartermaster General, but better-grade shoes that would sell for about \$8.00 a pair.⁸⁸ When The Quartermaster General replied that he was authorized to purchase only low-quarter shoes that sold for less than \$6.00 a pair and that the Army Exchange Service would procure and sell all others,⁸⁹ the Chief Quartermaster began negotiations with Colonel Robert J. Marshburn.⁹⁰ The European Theater Exchange Officer agreed to requisition the shoes but insisted that the Quartermaster Service sell them through sales stores.⁹¹

When it became apparent in October 1944 that the Army Exchange Service could not procure enough shoes to meet Theater requirements, the Chief Quartermaster suggested that The Quartermaster General be given authority to procure the deficit.⁹² The suggestion could not be accepted, for the critical shortage of leather precluded increased production and the Army Service Forces continued to insist that the Army Exchange Service handle the problem.⁹³ The Army Services Forces eventually reversed its decision, however, for Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell reported during his visit to the European Theater in January 1945 that The Quartermaster General had been given permission to standardize better-grade shoes for officers.⁹⁴ During the next few months the Office of The Quartermaster General, the War Production Board, and the Office of the Chief Quartermaster combined their talents to expedite the delivery of shoes. When redeployment began, enough low-quarter shoes were on hand to complete the sartorial splendor of officers returning to the United States.

"Any man may be in good spirits and good temper when he's well dressed," said Martin Chuzzlewit. "There ain't much credit in that."

CURSORY EVALUATION

Though the post exchange program did not attain perfection, its accomplishments would have been pleasing to the author of those first

army regulations published in 1779. Troops across the Atlantic Ocean did receive "comforts and conveniences" unheard of in von Steuben's day and unavailable in the United States. Top priority could not be given to post exchange supplies at the expense of ammunition, fuels, food, and clothing. Pilferage of items that brought high prices in the European black market could not have been wholly prevented. A certain amount of loss in transit, with its accompanying deprivations, was a corollary of shipment during combat.

Post exchanges introduced to foreign countries many American products and customs. Pony editions of American magazines, from which the ubiquitous advertiser was excluded,

found their way to European living rooms, where someone was able to read them. Tourists from the United States, who were once forced to drink hot tea and coffee and lukewarm wine for the lack of the cold drinks they craved, can now find their favorite colas not only in the cities but in many an isolated hamlet and way-side inn. Manufacturers of American cigarettes have cultivated a buying public in every European country. The American shoe, always better than its European counterpart, helped to confirm the report that a United States Army officer could be

"The glass of fashion and the mould of form,
The observed of all observers!"

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


Figure 35.—Romney Huts Used for Storage in England.




Figure 36.—Semi-Romney Huts under Construction on the Continent.




Figure 37.—Squad Tent Used as Dump Headquarters on Continent.




Figure 38.—Method of Covering Supplies with Tarpaulins.

